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With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), the U.S. Congress introduced sweeping 
substantive and procedural reforms for securities class actions.  A 
central provision of the Act is the lead plaintiff provision, which 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the investor with the largest 
financial interest in a securities fraud class action should be 
appointed the lead plaintiff for the suit.  The lead plaintiff provision 
was adopted to encourage a class member with a large financial 
stake to become the class representative.  Congress expected that 
such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a securities 
fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that 
may arise when class counsel’s interests diverge from those of the 
shareholder class. 
 Now, more than ten years after the enactment of the lead 
plaintiff provision, the claim that the lead plaintiff, and particularly 
the lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, is a more effective 
monitor of class counsel in securities fraud class actions continues to 
be intuitively appealing, but remains unproven.  In this study, 
Professors Cox and Thomas inquire anecdotally and empirically 
whether the lead plaintiff provision has performed as projected.  The 
anecdotal evidence they uncover is mixed, in some instances 
demonstrating the virtues of the lead plaintiff provision, while in 
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others showing that the provision has encountered difficulties, 
including hesitance among institutional lead plaintiffs to take on the 
burden of serving as lead plaintiff (though recently more institutional 
investors are taking on the role of lead plaintiff) and allegations of 
“pay-to-play” schemes between plaintiffs’ law firms and potential 
lead plaintiffs. 
Professors Cox and Thomas then conduct a series of statistical 
analyses of the lead plaintiff provision’s costs and benefits.  
Surprisingly, their results indicate that the ratio of settlement 
amounts to estimated provable losses in securities class actions---the 
most important indicator of whether investors have been 
compensated for their damages---has been lower since the passage 
of PSLRA and that settlement size has not increased since the 
passage of PSLRA.  However, they also find that the presence of an 
institutional investor increases the dollar amount of settlements in 
those cases in which they appear, suggesting that the current trend 
for institutional investors to be lead plaintiffs in securities class 
actions will positively affect average settlement size in such actions 
in the future.  Their analysis also sheds new light on the relative 
impacts other types of lead plaintiffs, such as individuals versus an 
aggregation of individuals, have on the outcome of settlements.  They 
conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of their 
findings. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (“PSLRA” or “the Act”),1 the U.S. Congress introduced sweeping 
substantive and procedural reforms for securities class actions.  A central 
provision of the Act is the lead plaintiff provision,2 which creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the investor with the largest financial interest in a securities 
fraud class action should be appointed the lead plaintiff for the suit.3  The lead 
plaintiff provision was adopted to encourage a class member with a large 
 
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.) (amending Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77z-1 (2000)) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4)). 
2. See id. sec. 101(a), § 27(a) (amending 15. U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)); id. sec. 101(b), § 27D(a) 
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)). 
3. The idea behind the lead plaintiff provision was first proposed in an influential law 
review article by Professors Weiss and Beckerman.  See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, 
Let the Money Do the Monitoring:  How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in 
Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2057–58 (1995) (arguing that institutional investor 
would more likely serve as “litigation monitor” if made lead plaintiff, but claiming that judicial 
practices discouraged such assignment). 
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financial stake to become the class representative.  Congress expected that 
such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class 
action4 so as to reduce the litigation agency costs5 that may arise when class 
counsel’s interests diverge from those of the shareholder class.6  The Congress 
clearly envisioned that various financial institutions—pension funds, insurance 
companies, and mutual funds—were the most likely types of investors who 
could combine a large financial stake in the suit’s outcome with the 
sophistication to guide the suit to an appropriate result.  Proponents of the 
provision claimed that there would be substantial benefits from having 
institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, including more favorable 
settlement terms, lower attorneys’ fees for class counsel, fewer strike suits, 
more adjudications of class actions,7 greater deterrence of securities fraud, and 
the reduction of some potential costs.8  To be sure, the net benefits that would 
 
4. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 
(“[I]ncreasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit the class 
and assist the courts.”). 
5. A very different agency cost problem is whether institutional investors that are the 
victims of fraudulent reporting systematically fail to present proof of their losses in settled 
securities class actions so that their lapse harms their beneficiaries.  See James D. Cox & Randall 
S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table:  Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in 
Securities Class Actions?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 855, 875–77 tbls.2 & 3 (2002) [hereinafter Cox & 
Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table] (finding that more than two-thirds of those required to 
record their holdings of public companies with SEC failed to submit proof of claims in fifty-three 
securities class action settlements); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip 
Through Your Fingers:  Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial 
Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411, 421–24 
tbl.1 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip] (finding that, in 108 settled 
securities class actions, 72% of large investors fail to present proof of claims). 
6. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of 
Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 53 
[hereinafter Fisch, Aggregation] (arguing that lead plaintiff can “reduce agency costs and improve 
litigation decisions”).  For a more general discussion of litigation agency costs in class actions, 
see Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:  
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133, 148–56 (2004). 
7. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2121–23. 
8. See, e.g., Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation:  
The Role of Institutional Investors, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1997, at 155, 156–57 
[hereinafter Johnson, Deterrence] (suggesting that institutions develop more graduated fee 
structures to discourage class counsel from bringing “unnecessary” suits; seek damages directly 
from officers and directors who had engaged in wrongdoing; and ask for governance changes at 
companies where firm’s culture or internal governance structure had contributed to problem).
 Private suits are not the only means of assuring deterrence, as violators can also be 
prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and even the Department of 
Justice.  For a study of the profile of the type of suit that attracts both private and SEC actions as 
contrasted with those that only attract the attention of private litigants, see James D. Cox & 
Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws:  Have Things 
Changed Since Enron?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 893, 901–02 (2005) (finding that SEC 
involvement is more likely to occur, post-2001, in settlements involving larger market 
capitalization issuers); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement 
Heuristics:  An Empirical Inquiry, 53 Duke L.J. 737, 764–66 (2004) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, 
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flow from the lead plaintiff provision were impossible to estimate when it was 
adopted in 1995; nonetheless, the premise that institutions would make more 
effective monitors than individual investors seemed reasonable and was not 
seriously contested. 
Now, more than ten years after the enactment of the lead plaintiff 
provision, the claim that the lead plaintiff, and particularly the lead plaintiff 
that is an institutional investor, is a more effective monitor of class counsel in 
securities fraud class actions continues to be intuitively appealing, but remains 
unproven.9  In this study, we inquire empirically whether the lead plaintiff 
provision has performed as projected.  More importantly, this study provides 
insights into how the type of plaintiff impacts settlements of securities class 
actions.  We begin on an anecdotal level in Part I, raising examples scattered 
throughout the literature and popular press of instances where institutional lead 
plaintiffs have achieved large settlements in high profile cases, negotiated 
advantageous attorneys’ fee agreements, and apparently acted as good 
monitors in reducing litigation agency costs. 
However, the evidence bearing on the virtues of the institutional lead 
plaintiff is not all positive.  Disturbingly, many institutions have been reluctant 
to assume the role of lead plaintiff, especially in smaller cases.10  The available 
evidence suggests that, as late as 2001, institutions had appeared in only 5 to 
10% of all securities fraud class actions, although there are indications that 
they are getting involved more frequently in recent years.11  Indeed, in our 
study of 388 settlements, pension funds and other financial institutions 
represented a very small percentage of the post-PSLRA plaintiffs.  As our data 
 
SEC Heuristics] (finding that, for settlements prior to 2002, parallel SEC enforcement action 
more likely involved smaller market capitalization issuers experiencing financial distress than 
settlements arising from violations that did not involve parallel SEC enforcement action). 
9. Compare, e.g., Max W. Berger et al., Institutional Investors as Lead Plaintiffs:  Is There a 
New and Changing Landscape?, 75 St. John’s L. Rev. 31, 31–32 (2001) (concluding that larger 
settlements are due to expanding role of institutions as lead plaintiffs), with John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Litigation Governance:  A Gentle Critique of the Third Circuit Task Force Report, 74 Temp. L. 
Rev. 805, 807 (2001) [hereinafter Coffee, Litigation Governance] (arguing that it is “reasonable” 
but unproven that institutional lead counsel can perform effectively). 
10. See, e.g., Martin v. Atchison Casting Corp., 200 F.R.D. 453, 456–57 (D. Kan. 2001) 
(bemoaning that court had only two extremely small investors who had petitioned to be lead 
plaintiffs and that it had no power to conscript larger institution in class to become lead plaintiff). 
11. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2003 Securities Litigation Study 6 (2003), available 
at www.10b5.com/2003_study.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“In 2002 
institutional investors and public investment or pension funds comprised 51 percent of the lead 
plaintiffs for all cases filed.  In 2003 these major investors represented 42 percent of the lead 
plaintiffs in cases filed.”); Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post-
Reform Act Securities Lawsuits:  Settlements Reported Through December 2003, at 9 (2004) 
(“Approximately 30% of all post-Reform Act settlements have involved institutions serving as 
lead plaintiffs.”).  If we focus only on public pension fund lead plaintiffs, then these numbers 
drop significantly.  For example, the PricewaterhouseCoopers study cited above finds that in 
2003, based on cases filed through September 30, public pension funds filed only 28% of the 
cases in their sample.  See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra, at 6. 
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reveals, by any metric—for example, the number of settled cases, the dollar 
amount of settlements, or the provable losses suffered by the class—a 
securities class action suit’s representative is far more likely to be an 
aggregation of nonfinancial institutional investors or even a single individual.  
Thus we examine here not only whether having a financial institution as a lead 
plaintiff impacts the quality of the settlement, but also whether differences 
exist between suits having as their representative an aggregation of 
nonfinancial institutions and individuals versus a single individual investor as 
the class representative. 
Moreover, there have been press reports that institutions are aggressively 
lobbied by plaintiffs’ law firms to appear as lead plaintiffs.  One prominent 
business publication went so far as to imply the presence of “pay-to-play” 
schemes.  This practice, if present, means political contributions are made in 
exchange for institutional investors’ agreement to become a lead plaintiff and 
to select a preferred law firm as class counsel.12  While such claims are 
difficult to verify empirically, we reviewed state-posted electronic information 
about lobbyists and found some evidence that plaintiffs’ law firms have hired 
lobbyists in several states.  We have also learned from pension fund officials 
that these lobbyists have attempted to persuade them to act as lead plaintiffs.  
And we have personally observed the efforts of several plaintiffs’ firms to host 
conferences and other gatherings designed to attract institutions. 
After this anecdotal cost-benefit comparison, we turn to our empirical 
analysis in Part II.  Our data shows that courts consistently favor financial 
institutions over other types of investors when there is a contest among them to 
be appointed lead plaintiff.  As will be seen in Part II.A, in the overwhelming 
majority of the Westlaw and Lexis cases in which a court issued an opinion 
selecting one lead plaintiff candidate over another, we found that courts 
invariably select institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in lieu of other types 
of petitioners.  We therefore explore whether this preference is borne out by 
the evidence, namely whether financial institutions are the most effective 
monitors of the class counsel. 
In order to do so, in Part II.B we examine the size of actual lead plaintiffs’ 
claims.  For a group of thirty-five class action settlements, we have complete 
data on the lead plaintiff’s actual claims which we obtained from proprietary 
databases of claims administrators.  We break the lead plaintiffs into four 
categories:  public pension funds; other institutional investors; single 
individual lead plaintiffs; and aggregate groups of lead plaintiffs.  We find that 
the lead plaintiff public pension funds in our sample have much larger dollar 
claims than any of the other types of lead plaintiff.13  The lead plaintiff public 
pension funds on average represent a much larger percentage (4%) of the 
 
12. See Neil Weinberg & Daniel Fisher, The Class Action Industrial Complex, Forbes, Sept. 
20, 2004, at 150, 152–53.  
13. Furthermore, on average, the public pension fund claims are bigger than 99.7% of all the 
other claims filed in those cases. 
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claims filed in the case, too.  By contrast, single individual investors that are 
lead plaintiffs have the smallest average total dollar claims and represent on 
average the smallest percentage (0.11%) of the claims filed in cases.  Overall, 
our data suggests that only institutional investor lead plaintiffs have large 
enough stakes in these cases to justify their active monitoring of the class 
counsel. 
In Part II.C, we turn to an analysis of a sample of securities fraud class 
action settlements to further investigate the effect of the lead plaintiff 
provision.  We begin with descriptive statistics for the key variables in our 
sample.  We find that, first, with the exception of the small set of cases where 
institutional investors have acted as lead plaintiffs, there are no significant 
differences between the pre-PSLRA and post-PSLRA cases in our sample with 
respect to almost every relevant characteristic:  settlement amounts, length of 
class period, size of defendant firms, and estimated provable losses.  In other 
words, only institutional investor lead plaintiffs appear to be associated with 
any difference in these metrics. 
We were, however, shocked to find that the ratio of settlement amounts to 
estimated provable losses—which is the most important indicator of whether 
investors are being compensated for their damages—was statistically lower in 
the post-PSLRA period.  After the passage of PSLRA, investors in our sample 
appear to be worse off because they are recovering a lower percentage of their 
losses.  One possible interpretation of this finding is that Congress should 
repeal PSLRA in its entirety if it wishes to help defrauded investors. 
We next use multivariate regressions to test three different hypotheses.  
First, we hypothesize that PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision has increased the 
dollar amount of settlements in securities fraud class actions.  Our results show 
that after controlling for estimated losses, market capitalization of defendant 
firms, the length of class period, and the presence of parallel SEC actions, the 
dollar amount of post-PSLRA settlements is not statistically different from that 
of the pre-PSLRA cases in our sample.  This finding suggests that PSLRA has 
not raised overall settlement size. 
Second, we analyze the determinants of institutional investors’ decisions 
to become lead plaintiffs in the cases in our sample.  We hypothesize that 
institutions are more likely to become lead plaintiffs in cases involving larger 
provable losses, with longer class periods, with larger defendant firms, and 
when there is a parallel SEC enforcement action.  Our results are consistent 
with this hypothesis.  In other words, institutional investors are selecting the 
biggest cases in which to appear as lead plaintiffs. 
Finally, we theorize that institutional lead plaintiffs will be the most 
effective in raising settlement size.  In our regression, we find that the presence 
of an institutional lead plaintiff improves the settlement size, even holding 
constant estimated provable losses, firm market capitalization, the length of 
class period, and the presence of an SEC enforcement action.  This result 
suggests that the trend toward using institutional investors as lead plaintiffs 
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will have a positive effect on settlement size in securities fraud cases. 
Our focus is not isolated to the effects of institutional lead plaintiffs.  We 
also examine whether settlements are significantly different among various 
types of noninstitutional lead plaintiffs:  a single individual, an aggregation of 
individuals, and a group comprised of individuals and a noninstitutional entity.  
We conclude that individual lead plaintiffs perform best in the smallest cases 
and worst in the large cases. 
In our concluding section, we discuss the policy implications of our 
results and the current status of the lead plaintiff provision. 
I.  THE PROMISE OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION 
A.  The Value of Lead Plaintiff Monitoring in Reducing Litigation Agency 
Costs 
At the heart of the lead plaintiff provision is Congress’s belief that the 
securities class action needed an “owner” of the suit’s outcome.  This belief is 
founded on Congress’s appreciation of the weak incentives that abound to act 
in the class interest in securities class actions.14 
Well before 1995, the problem of incentives for class action suits was 
understood.  Because class action suits typically were maintained on a 
contingency fee basis, the class attorney had a nontrivial investment in the suit 
that assumed increasing importance to the attorney as it proceeded.  
Maintaining a portfolio of such suits spread the risk of failing to recoup costs 
among several possible actions.  But the risk remained, and the attorney could 
be expected to be a rational economic actor.  As such, a settlement offer that 
provided recovery of the attorney’s tangible and opportunity costs could loom 
larger than the prospect of aggressively pursuing the action to a more lucrative 
prospective judgment or settlement.15 
The class action lawyer’s weak incentives to pursue aggressively a 
meritorious action were not overcome by the self-interest of the members of 
the class.  Class members suffered profound collective action problems that 
prevented close monitoring of the class action attorney.  Though class action 
procedures required that there be a representative of the class, the requirements 
to be such a representative were not very demanding.  The class representative 
 
14. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 
(observing that investors in class suits have “great difficulty exercising any meaningful direction 
over the case”). 
15. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:  Why the Model of 
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 230 (1983) (arguing that 
attorneys generally had more at stake in class actions than their clients); Jill E. Fisch, Class 
Action Reform:  Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1997) [hereinafter 
Fisch, Reform] (discussing goal of PSLRA to limit suits where settlements did not benefit 
individual plaintiffs but were of enormous financial benefit to their attorneys). 
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was frequently recruited by plaintiffs’ lawyers in the securities bar, who 
maintained “a list of potential plaintiffs and their stockholdings.”16  These 
plaintiffs were viewed as often “poorly informed about the theories of their 
cases, . . . totally ignorant of the facts, or . . . illiterate concerning financial 
matters.”17  In many instances, they had “close relationship[s] to the plaintiff’s 
lawyer or her firm.”18  Uninformed, and sometimes conflicted, class 
representatives were hardly ideal monitors.19 
Furthermore, the presiding judge, overwhelmed by a crowded docket and 
poorly armed against the possible self-interest of the attorneys who promoted 
the suit’s settlement,20 was not capable of effectively protecting the interests of 
the class.  And there was the ever present danger that suits were without merit 
and brought solely to extort a settlement at a level that was just a tad below the 
costs to defend the suit.21 
These perceived agency costs prompted Congress to enact the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995.22  The legislation, reflecting the 
 
16. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2060–61 (noting that prior to enactment of 
PSLRA, “usual pattern” for finding lead plaintiff was for plaintiffs’ lawyer to “take the initiative” 
in launching securities fraud action after observing significant move in defendant company’s 
stock price). 
17. Id. at 2060. 
18. Id. 
19. See id. at 2064–65 (“No one disputes that a named plaintiff who has only a nominal 
financial interest in a class action, especially a plaintiff that an attorney has ‘recruited,’ is unlikely 
to monitor effectively her attorney’s prosecution of the action or the terms [of the settlement].”); 
Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 56 (“The stakes of class members are generally too small to 
warrant active monitoring.  Instead, class actions are effectively run by class counsel.  Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers bear most of the risk of the lawsuit and exercise virtually complete control over litigation 
decisions.”); Johnson, Deterrence, supra note 8, at 156 (“Clients have been notoriously absent in 
class action litigation.”). 
20. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting) (“Once a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms 
with their former adversaries to defend [their] joint handiwork . . . .”).  A more cynical view of 
the judge’s role in reviewing settlements appears in In re Warner Communications Securities 
Litigation, 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he court starts from the familiar axiom 
that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.”).  See generally James D. Cox, 
Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 497, 523–24 (1997) (arguing 
that PSLRA may have focused on wrong issues because courts have always had power to select 
more meritorious plaintiff as class representative and to impose sanctions for baseless suits). 
21. A related problem is that class counsel would agree to a lowball settlement of a 
meritorious claim in exchange for a large fee.  See Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 57 (noting 
this problem to be “[t]he most commonly cited example of the potential conflict between lawyer 
and client interests”); Johnson, Deterrence, supra note 8, at 156 (“Lack of effective client 
oversight has led to concern that class counsel might prosecute class actions in a way that 
produces the greatest legal fees rather than the result that would be most beneficial to class 
members.”). 
22. See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench:  Judging 
Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 1239, 1286 (“Both the statutory language 
and the legislative history of the PSLRA make manifest Congress’s concern that securities class 
counsel, if left unmonitored, will behave in ways that harm both absent class members and the 
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interests of the narrow group of high-tech executives and accounting firms who 
were its strongest backers, focused only on the conduct of private securities 
litigation.23  The PSLRA establishes a process to select a class representative.  
Under the supervision of the court, notice is published to class members 
seeking one or more to become the representative.  Any shareholder that is a 
member of the class can respond by filing a motion to be appointed lead 
plaintiff.  The court, within ninety days of the notice’s publication, is required 
to select a lead plaintiff.24 
In making this decision, the court is guided by the PSLRA’s provision 
that there is a rebuttable presumption that the member of the class with the 
largest financial stake in the relief sought is the “most adequate plaintiff.”25  
 
private enforcement system generally.”); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 6, at 136–37 (noting 
that such “litigation agency costs” prompted Congress to pass PSLRA). 
23. Antitrust, product liability, and other types of suits that are commonly maintained as 
class actions, and for which the same weak incentives abound, were unaffected by this legislation.  
The PSLRA altered many features of class action securities litigation.  Foremost of these in the 
minds of class action lawyers is the heightened pleading requirement.  Abandoning seven decades 
of notice pleading, the Act requires that securities fraud claims must be made with such 
particularity as to raise a “strong inference” of a violation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).  
This stronger pleading requirement is coupled with the Act’s bar of any discovery until the 
disposition of motions to dismiss, including a motion to dismiss for failure to plead with the 
requisite particularity.  See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).  The class action attorney is therefore caught in 
the procedural jaws of a strong vice that first demands that the complaint set forth facts 
establishing a strong inference that the defendants knowingly or recklessly misrepresented a 
material fact, while simultaneously depriving the attorney of discovery procedures whereby facts 
could be gathered to support the allegation.  Although estimates vary, one source claims that, 
after passage of the PSLRA, approximately one-quarter of the motions to dismiss in securities 
class actions are granted.  See Lisa Klein Wager & Adrienne M. Ward, Securities Class Actions:  
A Company’s Bad News Gets Worse, Bus. L. Today, July–Aug. 2002, at 15, 18.  A more recent 
study found that 40.3% of securities class actions filed between 1998 and 2003 were dismissed.  
See Ronald I. Miller et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action 
Litigation:  Beyond the Mega-Settlements, Is Stabilization Ahead? 4 (2006).  Before the PSLRA, 
20.3% of the suits filed in 1991–1995 were dismissed within five years of their filing.  See Elaine 
Buckberg et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation:  
Are WorldCom and Enron the New Standard? 3 (2005) [hereinafter Buckberg et al., WorldCom 
and Enron]. 
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3). 
25. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii).  For the rare instance when the largest loss does not qualify one 
to be a class’s lead plaintiff, see Tice v. Novastar Fin., Inc., No. 04-0330, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16800, at *24 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2004) (believing market maker would be subject to unique 
defenses even though having largest loss among those petitioning to be lead plaintiff and 
therefore selecting plaintiff with second largest loss along with two individual investors); In re 
Terayon Commc’ns Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C 00-01967, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3131, at *21–
*22 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2004) (removing as lead plaintiff entities with large losses incurred in 
connection with defendant corporation’s apparent scheme to depress its common shares using 
massive short sales). 
 Because the lead plaintiff provision makes rebuttable the presumption that the petitioner with 
the largest loss is the most adequate plaintiff, Congress obviously recognized that other 
considerations may more aptly qualify one to be a lead plaintiff despite that petitioner’s smaller 
loss.  To be sure, it may be easiest to see the presumption being overcome by extreme facts, such 
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The Act does not prescribe all the roles that the lead plaintiff can fulfill, but it 
does include selection of class counsel among the lead plaintiff’s roles.26  In 
doing so, Congress sought to reverse the pre-PSLRA practice of counsel 
choosing the plaintiff rather than the plaintiff choosing counsel.27 
The theory behind this structure was that institutions with the largest 
losses would have the most to gain from becoming better monitors of the 
conduct of the litigation.  Institutional investors would reject quick settlements 
of meritorious cases because these settlements would not compensate them for 
their losses.28  Proponents optimistically projected that activist institutions 
 
as that the petitioner was a market maker.  See, e.g., Tice, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16800, at *24 
(suggesting that market maker is subject to unique defenses and is therefore not most adequate 
plaintiff in spite of having largest losses among those petitioning).  However, the PSLRA places 
explicit limits on a competing petitioner’s ability to discover the existence of unique defenses that 
would impair the petitioner with the largest loss from being an effective representative of the 
class.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)–(B)(iv); Steiner v. Aurora Foods, Inc., No. 00-
602, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20341, at *15 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2000) (holding that individual 
plaintiff who merely alleged possibility that lead plaintiff would have unique defenses failed to 
overcome presumption).  For a case permitting discovery once the court was satisfied of the 
possibility of unique defenses, see Crawford v. Onyx Software Corp., [2001–2002 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,682 (W.D. Wa. Jan. 10, 2002) (permitting discovery 
against petitioner because its assertion of claims under both 1933 and 1934 Acts may be subject 
to unique defenses that render their representation of 1934 Act claims inadequate).  Moreover, the 
court may well prefer a single institution to a loose aggregation of individuals who collectively 
have a much larger loss.  For example, in Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sciences Corp., 187 F.R.D. 
246, 251 (E.D. Va. 1999), a group of retirement funds was preferred by the court over several 
individuals who collectively had a larger loss, in part because the group of funds, unlike the 
individuals, had an established procedure for acting collectively. 
 There is reason to question whether the lead plaintiff provision has even broader 
consequences.  Some courts believe that the lead plaintiff provision raises the bar that one must 
clear to be deemed an adequate representative.  Thus, the Fifth Circuit recently recognized in 
Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 480–81 (5th Cir. 2001), that the presiding 
court has an obligation to satisfy itself that the lead plaintiff is capable of directing the litigation.  
The Fifth Circuit held that the court must assure itself that the lead plaintiff “possess[es] a 
sufficient level of knowledge and understanding to be capable of ‘controlling’ or ‘prosecuting’ 
the litigation.”  Id. at 482–83.  The court, therefore, understood the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff 
provision to raise the standard above the adequacy threshold that applies to class actions in other 
contexts.  See id. at 483.  To this end, the court held it would consider the fee agreement the 
petitioner had negotiated with the proposed lead counsel.  It would thereby determine whether the 
plaintiff was not just the petitioner with the largest loss, but the most adequate among those 
petitioning to be named lead plaintiff.  Berger appears to represent a distinctly minority position, 
as other courts do not seek to confirm a petitioner’s larger loss qualifying it to be a lead plaintiff 
by examining the negotiations the petitioner has had with proposed counsel.  See, e.g., In re 
Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court’s selection of 
petitioner whose loss of $59,000 was much smaller than that of other petitioners but who had 
negotiated fee one-half the rate of counsel to represent five petitioning businessmen whose total 
losses were $3.3 million). 
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
27. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730 (stating impetus for legislation was “manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients 
whom they purportedly represent”). 
28. See Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 538–39 (“[L]arge investor[s] ha[ve] a financial 
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would garner “disproportionately large benefits” from their involvement as 
lead plaintiffs because they would increase the return on their funds’ larger 
investments.29  These gains would bolster the funds’ comparative performance 
vis-à-vis other institutions and result in further benefits for the activists.  
Furthermore, since institutional investors who manage other people’s money 
have fiduciary obligations to take “reasonable steps to realize on claims that 
will advance the interests of beneficiaries,”30 proponents of the PSLRA 
structure were optimistic that institutional investors would become involved in 
these cases. 
While the lead plaintiff provision was principally designed to improve 
shareholder monitoring of class counsel, its proponents also hoped that it 
would introduce market forces into class action litigation and change the ways 
in which plaintiffs’ securities law firms did business.  For example, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers would “no longer find it necessary to race to the courthouse” but could 
instead more carefully investigate the merits of potential claims before 
deciding whether to file complaints.31  Furthermore, institutional investors 
might be solicited by plaintiffs’ law firms to become lead plaintiffs, but, as 
more experienced and sophisticated clients, such institutions would be better 
able to select competent class counsel. 
In the next two subsections, we examine the benefits and costs of the lead 
plaintiff provision.  Our analysis is based on interviews with institutional 
investors, survey data, reported cases, and earlier research by other scholars.  
Our survey data is taken from a confidential survey of institutional investors 
that had served, or had considered serving, as lead plaintiffs in securities fraud 
class actions.32 
B.  Beneficial Effects of the Lead Plaintiff Provision 
There are many levels at which the lead plaintiff can enhance the welfare 
 
incentive to prevent plaintiffs’ counsel from selling out legitimate claims too easily . . . .”). 
29. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2111. 
30. Johnson, Deterrence, supra note 8, at 157.  But see Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money on 
the Table, supra note 5, at 877 (finding that between two-thirds and three-quarters of institutional 
investors failed to file claims in securities fraud class action settlements to recover their share of 
settlement fund). 
31. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2106; see also Elliott J. Weiss, Comment, The 
Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39 
Ariz. L. Rev. 561, 561–62 (1997) (“[Prior to PSLRA,] a relatively small number of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys regularly were filing class actions only hours or days after the disclosure of information 
that precipitated a major move in the price of a corporation’s stock.”). 
32. We distributed the survey to a large number of institutional investors in conjunction with 
another survey of claims filing practices.  We received seven completed surveys back.  Given the 
complexity of the survey and the sensitivity of the information being requested, it is not 
surprising that our response rate was so low.  Because of the low response rate, we offer the 
results of the survey as anecdotal evidence only and make no attempt to use it to draw statistical 
inferences.  We thank those institutions that were willing to share this information with us. 
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of all members of the class.  Areas that have attracted attention by the courts 
and commentators include the selection of the lead class attorney as well as the 
shaping of the attorneys’ fee structure.33  Before 1995, courts usually selected 
the attorneys that were first to file a securities fraud complaint as the lead 
counsel for the class.34  This judicial practice led to a “race to the courthouse,” 
as the lead counsel position can be quite lucrative for the firm that is chosen.35 
After the passage of PSLRA, things changed in cases where institutional 
investors became involved as lead plaintiffs.  In some instances, efforts of lead 
plaintiffs have visibly yielded results to the class’s benefit.  For example, in 
Moore v. Halliburton, the court refused to approve a settlement when one of 
the class’s lead plaintiffs protested that the settlement accomplished too 
little.36  Moore involved a class counsel that did not consult with the protesting 
lead plaintiff and proceeded to reach a settlement that was smaller than the 
sanction the SEC had imposed on the defendant for the same misbehavior 
alleged in the class action.37 
The strongest embrace the lead plaintiff provision has received from the 
courts is In re Cendant Corp. Litigation.38  The Third Circuit held that, with 
rare exceptions, the court should defer to the lead plaintiff’s decision about 
who should be the class attorney as well as what the fee arrangement should be 
for the class counsel.39  The Cendant court also reversed the decision of the 
 
33. See, e.g., Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 92–93 (describing how institutional 
investors are negotiators of “sophisticated compensation agreements that reduce legal fees and 
minimize agency costs”).  
34. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2062.  In jurisdictions where the courts 
preferred to allow the filing attorneys to determine which among them would be appointed as lead 
counsel, early filing was still important.  In this situation, the first filing attorneys would 
frequently “share copies of their complaints with other plaintiffs’ lawyers who [would] support 
their election as lead counsel.”  Id. at 2063. 
35. See id. at 2062 (“The lead counsel effectively controls the conduct of a class action, 
including assignment of work among all lawyers who represent putative class action plaintiffs.  If 
the lead counsel chooses to do much of the work herself, she will be able to claim the lion’s share 
of any fees awarded.”); see also Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 56–57 (noting that pre-
PSLRA practice of selecting counsel based on first to file rule encouraged, among other abuses, 
counsel to “seek out prospective plaintiffs”). 
36. No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18187, at *15–*21 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 
2004).  This is not to say that the opposition of a lead plaintiff dooms the settlement.  See Kloster 
v. McColl (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 350 F.3d 747, 752 (8th Cir. 2003) (approving 
settlement over objections of three members of one lead plaintiff group in class action involving 
four plaintiff classes). 
37. See Moore, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18187, at *13–*20 (discussing SEC’s imposition of 
$7.5 million penalty when proposed class action settlement was $6 million). 
38. 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).  Subsequently, the Third Circuit also held that there is a 
rebuttable presumption of the correctness of the lead plaintiff’s decision not to compensate three 
law firms that represented some class members and that provided various professional services 
they argued benefited the class.  See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 197–98 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (viewing primary responsibility for deciding attorneys’ compensation as shifting from 
court to lead plaintiff after appointment of lead plaintiff). 
39. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 276 (holding that courts should defer to lead 
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trial court that substituted an auction among competing law firms to select the 
class’s attorney for the agreed-upon fee.40  Cendant is a dramatic illustration of 
how institutional investor involvement can impact positively the selection and 
compensation of the class’s lead counsel.  The fee structure negotiated by the 
lead plaintiff was approximately $76 million less than the lowest bid submitted 
via the auction carried out by the trial court.41  The result in Cendant reflects 
the broader experience of institutional investors:  They are often able to lower 
counsel fees to one-half to one-third of the historical average of 32% of the 
recovery.42 
To the extent a lead plaintiff can substitute bargaining between the lead 
plaintiff and the class counsel for the auction process, this may more accurately 
account for additional, societally relevant factors.  If fees are but one of many 
factors in evaluating the value of class counsel, the auction process as 
conducted by courts probably poorly internalizes the other factors into the 
process.  For example, the auction process is ill suited for sharp judgments on 
less quantifiable factors such as the quality of the representation, the likely 
timeliness of the suit’s disposition, and the responsiveness of the lead plaintiff 
to the interests of the class members.43  We suspect that lead plaintiff-class 
 
plaintiff’s choice of counsel and fee agreement when choice is “reasonable on [its] own terms”); 
see also In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reasoning 
that auction approach is inconsistent with PSLRA’s emphasis on close client supervision of 
counsel).  For an illustration of how the court’s displeasure with the lead plaintiff’s inability to 
retain counsel on terms favorable to the class can lead to intervention by the supervising court, 
see In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482, 487–89 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
40. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 279 (reversing use of auction for abuse of 
discretion). 
41. Id. at 272 n.50. 
42. See Keith L. Johnson, Selecting Lead Counsel in the Midst of Judicial Chaos, 
Institutional Investor Advoc. (Bernstein Litowitz Berge & Grossman, New York, N.Y.), Third 
Quarter 2001, at 1, 2, available at http://www.blbglaw.com/advocate/adv2001Q3.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Johnson, Selecting Lead Counsel] (estimating that State 
of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) alone might have saved $6 million in legal fees over 
previous five years if other lead plaintiffs had employed “competitive fee setting practices”); see 
also Richard B. Schmitt, Pension Fund Plays Crucial Role in Suit, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1998, at 
B19 (reporting that SWIB acting as lead plaintiff had negotiated lead counsel fees of 18% of total 
settlement compared with national average of 32%); Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors:  
The Impact of Competition and Experience on Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions 2 (St. 
John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 06-0034, 2006), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=870577 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding “significant 
negative correlation between public pension fund participation as a lead plaintiff and both fee 
requests and fee awards”). 
43. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block:  Evaluating the Selection of Class 
Counsel by Auction, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 650, 710–16 (2002) (arguing that institutional investor 
empowerment more effectively incorporates market forces into selection of counsel than auctions 
do); Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 689, 704–
05 (2001) (concluding that auctions are inconsistent with goals of PSLRA and that traditional 
methods of selecting class counsel are preferable); Kendra S. Langlois, Note, Putting the Plaintiff 
Class’ Needs in the Lead:  Reforming Class Action Litigation by Extending the Lead Plaintiff 
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 855, 904 
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counsel negotiations therefore make possible a more nuanced perspective 
toward establishing the incentive structure for the class counsel.44 
Certainly the PSLRA empowers the lead plaintiff to “select and retain” 
counsel with the approval of the court,45 which envisions the possibility that 
the lead plaintiff may substitute counsel so as to bring an early conclusion to 
the case.46  This could occur when the lead plaintiff believes that the expected 
class recovery is dwarfed by the burdens imposed on the corporation and other 
defendants.47  Some institutional investors have expressed their frustration 
with settlements wrested largely from the defendant company in whom the 
institutions have a continuing ownership stake large enough that the settlement 
in part is borne by the institution itself: 
We [financial institutions] own these companies. . . . We are the market, 
or at least a recognizable fraction of it.  So I’m not sure it makes much 
sense to sue ourselves, give the plaintiff’s bar a cut of our money and then 
 
(2002) (explaining that lowest bidder may be too risk averse because of low fee caps to pursue 
aggressively large settlement).  But see James L. Tuxbury, Note, A Case for Competitive Bidding 
for Lead Counsel in Securities Class Actions, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 285, 290 (stating that 
class recovers higher percentage of settlement when attorneys’ fees are established by 
competitive bidding). 
44. It would be interesting to compare the performance of counsel selected by auctions with 
that of counsel selected under the lead plaintiff provision to see which produces a better recovery 
for shareholders.  Assuming that the data could be collected, the ratio of settlement amounts to 
estimated provable losses might be an appropriate yardstick. 
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2000). 
46. The heightened pleading standards also partially address the problem of cost-ineffective 
suits.  Heightened pleading standards probably work best to bar suits that are not well grounded in 
the facts, such as the infamous “strike suits” that were the focus of so much of the testimony in 
the hearings leading up to the PSLRA’s enactment.  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4, 9–11 
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (recounting how settlements depend less on 
suits’ merits than on defense costs and that plaintiff with true economic stake in suit would 
improve this calculus).  However, even the presence of a “strong inference” of scienter on the part 
of the company officers does not assure that the amount recoverable for the misrepresentation so 
committed will be economically significant.  Those responsible, including the corporate 
defendant, may have too few assets or insufficient insurance to provide any expectation of a 
material recovery.  Also, even the purposeful lie may not have impacted the security’s price to 
such a degree as to yield provable damages, or at least at the level to justify the suit’s 
continuance.  After all, any corporate burdens arising from the suit’s continuance and settlement 
may well be transmitted to class members who continue to hold shares in the corporate defendant.  
See Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (rejecting challenge to 
proposed lead plaintiff on grounds that Congress was aware of possibility that such plaintiff 
would continue to hold substantial interest in defendant and could be sensitive to defendant 
company’s welfare).  Such considerations existed prior to the PSLRA, and it was believed they 
would become even more frequent after the PSLRA institutionalized the formal appointment of a 
lead plaintiff who was likely to have a continuing significant ownership interest in the defendant.  
See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers:  A Case Study of Collective 
Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 595–96 (1996) (reviewing role 
of institutions in pursuing relatively quick dismissal of suit against large technology company). 
47. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2122–23 (suggesting that institutions might be 
able to discourage their counsel from pursuing suits with modest recoveries and high costs). 
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pocket (to be reinvested) the rest.  To the extent that there are third parties 
to cover the losses, we probably own them as well—including the 
insurance companies, the underwriters and the auditors.  Citigroup is a 
good example.  They settled their underwriter liability in WorldCom on 
[May 10] and their stock took a 2% hit as a result, which cost my funds 
about $6 [million].  It’s probably a temporary impact, but it illustrates the 
point.48 
On the other hand, the lead plaintiff—certainly one whose substantial 
trading loss has qualified it to be the lead plaintiff—can easily be seen as an 
important restraint on the class attorney settling the suit for too small an 
amount.  After all, the very purpose of the lead plaintiff provision is to harness 
effectively its self-interest to the class action by providing a mechanism for the 
class representative to be one who stands to recover a large amount through the 
aggressive prosecution of the suit.  Such a heavy hitter is more likely to 
overcome the personal interests of class counsel who may prefer the certainty 
of settling the suit quickly for a smaller amount to investing more of the law 
firm’s resources in pursuing a larger settlement that does not yield a 
proportional increase in counsel fees.49 
As institutional investors have become accustomed to the lead plaintiff 
provisions, some broader benefits have been realized.  Several of our survey 
respondents identified possible changes in corporate governance as an 
important potential benefit of becoming involved.  These institutions wanted to 
“change the system” and therefore were willing to expend the extra time and 
effort to become involved.  Institutional investor involvement may also be 
positively affecting the outcome of settlement negotiations,50 a topic to which 
we will return below. 
All of these benefits add up.  One leading institutional investor told us 
that acting as lead plaintiff at a minimum doubles, and often triples or 
quadruples, the amount that the institution would have expected to receive if it 
had not become involved.51  It also expects to reduce legal fees by one-half to 
 
48. E-mail from confidential institutional investor to authors (May 18, 2004) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
49. The classic illustration of institutional investors inserting themselves to cause the 
rejection of a weak settlement otherwise championed by the class counsel is In re California 
Micro Devices Securities Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 257, 275–76 (N.D. Cal. 1996), class certified and 
settlement approved, 965 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Cal. 1997), where intervening lead plaintiffs 
secured a settlement with more cash to class members and a contribution from culpable corporate 
directors. 
50. See Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 62 (discussing increasing sophistication of 
institutional investors in shareholder actions). 
51. See e-mail from Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of Wis. Inv. Bd., to authors 
(Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Johnson Correspondence] 
(stating that pension funds vastly increase their recovery by taking active lead plaintiff role); see 
also Schmitt, supra note 42 (noting that SWIB recovered more than 40% of its estimated damages 
in CellStar litigation where it acted as lead plaintiff as compared to average recovery in securities 
class actions of 14% of total damages). 
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one-third of those normally paid in federal securities class actions.52  Finally, 
we note that being repeat players seems to sharpen the skills of institutional 
lead plaintiffs, as they have developed litigation guidelines to apply in 
determining when to participate as lead plaintiffs, they have prequalified 
certain law firms as potential class counsel, and they have become more 
sophisticated in negotiating fee agreements.53 
Thus, multiple a priori beliefs that prompted Congress to enact the lead 
plaintiff provision find anecdotal support in the post-PSLRA case law.  Having 
an independent, engaged plaintiff is socially useful.  Despite these benefits, 
few financial institutions seek to so involve themselves, presumably because 
they do not see that the rewards of doing so are sufficient to offset the cost of 
becoming involved.  The next section examines the expected cost of being a 
lead plaintiff. 
C.  The Burdens of Being a Lead Plaintiff 
Despite this impressive list of benefits, institutional investors have been 
slow to answer the call to become lead plaintiffs.  This reluctance may be 
explained by the costs of doing so.  The SEC’s study of the first year’s 
experience under the PSLRA found that institutional investors identified a 
number of concerns about the costs and potential liability that they would face 
if they became lead plaintiffs.54  In particular, they identified the threat of 
discovery into the institutional investor’s business, the amount of time that 
they would need to spend to manage the case,55 the potential for disclosure of 
proprietary nonpublic information, and the threat of suit by other disgruntled 
plaintiffs.56  Others have noted that activist institutions also need to worry 
 
52. See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51; see also Johnson, Selecting Lead Counsel, 
supra note 42, at 2 (discussing role of plaintiff institutional investors in minimizing legal fees); 
Schmitt, supra note 42 (noting ability of SWIB to decrease legal fees in securities class action to 
18% of settlement instead of national average of 32% of settlement). 
53. Most of the survey respondents reported having adopted securities litigation policies that 
they applied in making their decision about whether to seek lead plaintiff status.  Several also 
reported that they had prequalified a number of potential law firms to act as lead counsel before 
deciding to apply for a lead plaintiff position.  See Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 62 
(“Institutions are developing guidelines to determine when their participation in shareholder 
litigation is desirable.  Institutions are developing ongoing relationships with plaintiffs’ firms and 
increasing sophistication in evaluating and negotiating fee arrangements.” (footnotes omitted)). 
54. Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report to the President and 
Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, at 48–49 (1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Office of the Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and 
Congress]. 
55. Institutions will need to bear the costs of investigating whether such claims are 
meritorious, reading the complaint, selecting the lead counsel, and actively overseeing the 
litigation and settlement of any cases.  See Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 542. 
56. See Office of the Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and Congress, supra note 54, at 
48–49. 
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about the effects of potential access to inside information on their trading 
activity or their loss of preferential access to information from defendant 
companies, as well as possible political pressure.57  Our conversations with 
attorneys active in securities litigation suggest that the potential hardships of 
being a lead plaintiff are an important factor that institutional investors are still 
considering before acting as lead plaintiffs,58 although the benefits of doing so 
may have become increasingly apparent to them.59  We discuss some of these 
costs below.60 
1.  Discovery Into the Lead Plaintiff’s Business Practices. — The 
possibility that defendants—and other plaintiffs’ law firms competing to obtain 
the lead plaintiff position—might seek to engage in disruptive discovery about 
institutional investors’ internal business practices and trading activities was 
well understood prior to the passage of PSLRA.61  It was foreseen that 
defendants would try to use discovery, or at least the threat of discovery, to 
discourage institutions from volunteering to become lead plaintiffs.62  Among 
the discovery issues that were projected as potential obstacles were the cost of 
producing information about the institution’s trading over the years, its 
investment philosophy, and other proprietary information.63  However, the 
early advocates of the lead plaintiff provision argued that such costs could be 
offset by judicial approval for reasonable expenses, perhaps augmented by 
 
57. See id. 
58. Other factors that we were told are considered include the relative merits of the case, the 
size of the loss, and the willingness of other institutional investors to take the lead plaintiff 
position.  Because settlements are distributed in proportion to each class member’s loss, and lead 
plaintiffs are not guaranteed they will be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in connection with 
being a lead plaintiff, these are significant reasons to not become a lead plaintiff.  See Johnson 
Correspondence, supra note 51.  Thus, the lead plaintiff provision poses significant free rider 
issues, a point examined below.  See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
59. Our survey respondents were very sensitive to the balance of costs and benefits of acting 
as lead plaintiffs.  For example, many of them required a multimillion dollar potential loss before 
they would even consider the possibility of becoming a lead plaintiff.   
60. In a related vein, institutions may take passive roles about becoming lead plaintiffs, 
much as they do with filing claims in settled class actions, because their recoveries, while 
positive, are not seen as significant enough in comparison to the overall amounts of money that 
they are managing.  See Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table, supra note 5, at 879–80 
(hypothesizing that small recoveries, even with large losses, would deter institutions from filing 
suit). 
61. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2101–03 (examining how institutions may fear 
“boxcar discovery” motions after filing suit). 
62. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 270 n.49 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that 
courts must be cautious in granting discovery against lead plaintiff so as to avoid harassment of 
lead plaintiff through discovery process); Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 545–46 (noting that 
defendants will seek discovery to challenge typicality of institutional investor as class 
representative or to investigate institution’s trading behavior which might bear on “the manner in 
which the class is defined and the institution’s reliance”). 
63. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2103 (recognizing that lead plaintiffs could 
face “[t]he cost of producing all documents concerning an institution’s investment philosophy and 
trading over several years [and other] disclosure of proprietary information”). 
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incentive awards to the lead plaintiff.64 
More directly, the Act conditions the ability of other potential class 
representatives to conduct discovery to challenge whether a petitioner should 
be appointed lead plaintiff to first demonstrating “a reasonable basis for a 
finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of 
adequately representing the class.”65  Although the PSLRA does not expressly 
limit the defendants’ ability to engage in discovery about the typicality or 
adequacy of an institution to act as a lead plaintiff, courts have found in the 
quoted provision congressional intent that defendants cannot engage in 
discovery for purposes of challenging the adequacy of the plaintiff to represent 
the class.66  Instead, defendants can engage in discovery that is focused on 
substantive issues relevant to the case.67 
Our discussions with attorneys in this area lead us to believe that 
discovery issues, while initially of some concern to institutions, have not 
proved to be too onerous.68  Defendants’ counsel have quickly learned that the 
investment advisors who advise institutional investors regarding securities 
transactions are extremely knowledgeable about the company’s securities 
filings and its financial statements.  In this sense, the lead plaintiff may well 
have more of the characteristics of a reasonable investor than do many of the 
class members.  As defendants contemplate their lack of success in 
demonstrating that the plaintiffs were not acting in reliance on the company’s 
statements or did not understand the meaning of its disclosures, their interest in 
pursuing discovery about the institutional investors’ actions has declined. 
2.  Greater Recoveries for Institutions That Pursue Their Own Actions. — 
Institutional investors with large potential claims have sometimes found it 
more advantageous to act for themselves rather than on behalf of all other 
investors.69  Institutional investors with such claims may believe that their 
claims are better pursued as individual claims than as part of a class action.70  
 
64. See id. at 2124 (“[C]ourts grant expenses and incentive awards to plaintiffs in some 
class actions [and there should be] no reason why they would not do the same for institutional 
plaintiffs.”). 
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2000). 
66. See, e.g., Fields v. Biomatrix, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 451, 455 (D.N.J. 2000) (denying 
discovery focused on adequacy of petitioner to represent class). 
67. See, e.g., In re Grand Casinos, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 615, 620–21 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(permitting discovery against lead plaintiff for purpose of inquiring in fraud on market case 
whether plaintiff in fact relied upon integrity of market when trading). 
68. Only one of our survey respondents identified the costs of discovery as a problem.  In 
that instance, the respondent reported that it had spent over forty hours of attorney time 
complying with discovery requests from the defendant in the case where it was acting as a lead 
plaintiff.  Confidential communications with authors (Mar. 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review).  We have also had discussions with attorneys that are active in the field about this issue 
and were told that their clients do not believe the discovery issues to be major ones.   
69. Four of our survey respondents reported at least one instance where they had opted out 
of a securities class action to pursue their own individual recovery. 
70. See Langlois, supra note 43, at 876 (“[Institutional] investors feel that they can present a 
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They may believe that, in a class action, their stronger claims will be combined 
with weaker claims to dilute their ultimate share of the settlement value.71  
Some evidence that has been gathered supports this point.72  Moreover, 
institutions, with their cadres of analysts, may be in a better position than other 
investors to sue under section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,73 
where they can likely meet its double reliance standard and thereby escape the 
necessity of pleading scienter.74 
On the other hand, institutions that opt out of a class action to pursue their 
own individual action do face risks.  Mainly, such institutions are no longer 
able to control the class action litigation.  But this should not be a major 
deterrent.  To be sure, an inadequate record and a poor settlement in a parallel 
class is likely to affect adversely the institution’s individual action.  However, 
many of the public pension funds that have been most active in this area want 
to try to fix the system.  They desire not only to improve the effectiveness of 
class action litigation, but also to strengthen the financial reporting process 
through corporate governance changes and to encourage recoveries from 
individual corporate officers and directors so that institutional plaintiffs do not 
bear indirectly some of the cost of the suit’s successful prosecution.75  These 
institutions may be limited in the number of cases in which they can get 
involved and would prefer to deploy their resources in class actions where they 
can have a broader impact.76 
3.  Disincentives to Becoming a Lead Plaintiff. — Institutional lead 
plaintiffs incur costs when monitoring the actions of lead counsel.  These costs 
include investigating the claims made, selecting lead counsel, reading any 
complaint or pleadings filed by counsel, and expending time and resources to 
 
stronger individual claim than class members can establish as a class action.”). 
71. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 46, at 571–72 (describing strategic benefits of class 
actions for weaker claimants and disadvantages for stronger claimants). 
72. See Langlois, supra note 43, at 876 (citing Implementation of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995:  Hearing Before the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 
21 (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission)). 
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000).  Section 18 causes of action lie only for material 
misrepresentations appearing in documents required to be filed with the SEC and are not 
available for misrepresentations appearing only in other media, such as press releases. 
74. See generally James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation:  Cases and Materials 553–54 
(5th ed. 2006) (reviewing elements of section 18). 
75. On the desirability of encouraging recovery from individual wrongdoers so as to avoid 
the circularity problem that arises when a corporation contributes significantly to a settlement that 
is awarded in part to its existing owners, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the 
Securities Class Action:  An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. __ 
(2006). 
76. For some institutions, such as public pension funds, the size of their staff may be limited 
by political considerations so that adding extra workers may not be possible even if it makes 
financial sense.  At other institutions, staff time may be limited because they are reluctant to 
increase staffing if they cannot increase their management fees to cover the additional expenses.  
Given that existing staff have other duties to perform, this caps the amount of staff time that can 
be devoted to litigation. 
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monitor the prosecution and possible settlement of the action.77  Related to 
such costs are potential “free rider problems, because institutions, particularly 
those concerned about minimizing administrative costs generally, are rationally 
apt to prefer that another investor take the initiative to become involved.”78  In 
fact, one attorney who represents institutional investors in securities fraud class 
actions told us that the first question his clients ask before considering 
undertaking a lead plaintiff position is whether any other institution is willing 
to do it.79 
Free rider problems have been a barrier to institutional investor activism 
in almost every area of corporate governance.80  The fact remains that, in the 
United States, even the largest institutional investors rarely own more than 5% 
of a company’s stock, making it imperative that they act as part of a group of 
investors if they wish to have a significant impact.  In all these situations, the 
costs of initiating and sponsoring action are borne by the activists, while any 
benefits fall proportionately among all members of the group.  Lead plaintiff 
proponents claim that free rider problems should not pose the same problems 
for institutions choosing to pursue that position because an institution does not 
need any other institution’s support to do so.81  In fact, the passivity of other 
institutions enhances the chances of the selection of activist funds as lead 
plaintiff, assuming such an institution chooses to act. 
However, institutional investors’ initial unwillingness to participate as 
lead counsel could well have been attributable to free rider problems.  Acting 
as an effective lead plaintiff can be a very time-consuming task in complex, 
aggressively litigated cases, where multiple suits against different sets of 
defendants at different points in time may be necessary in order to maximize 
the class recovery.  Of course, some cases are much more straightforward and 
require less oversight, and some institutions will devote less time than is 
needed to achieve the most appropriate client-driven litigation goals.  But, in 
general, an institutional investor lead plaintiff will probably need to devote 
significant amounts of out-of-pocket expenses, legal staff time, and investment 
staff time.  While out-of-pocket expenses are reimbursed in successful actions, 
the courts have only sometimes agreed to compensate institutions for the time 
spent by their in-house professional staff at market rates.82 
 
77. Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 542. 
78. Id. 
79. Telephone interview with confidential source (Mar. 2003). 
80. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law §§ 9.5.1–9.5.2 (1986) (explaining 
infrequency of proxy contests focused on corporate mismanagement in part being due to free 
rider problems associated with rationally apathetic stockholders). 
81. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2110–11. 
82. The PSLRA’s provisions provide that “[n]othing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
limit the award of reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the 
representation of the class . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) (2000); see also State of Wis. Inv. Bd. 
v. Bartlett, No. 17727, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *22–*23 (Del. Ch. 2002) (denying recovery 
and stating that SWIB had enough at stake to merit its involvement without award for costs); cf. 
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A number of our survey respondents identified monitoring costs as an 
important issue in their decisionmaking process, although their estimates of the 
time involved ranged widely from 40 to 100 hours to as much as 250 to 1000 
hours for their total involvement through settlement.83  As discussed in the 
preceding footnote, we obtained very complete estimates from the general 
counsel of a leading institutional investor.  Using these estimates and valuing 
the institution’s average personnel cost at $100 per hour, which seems quite 
 
Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that factors to be considered in 
providing incentive reward to class representative include whether representative’s actions 
conferred substantial benefit on class, time and effort expended, and steps representative has 
taken to protect class); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907, 913–14 (S.D. Ohio 2001) 
(permitting incentive award of $50,000 to individual class representative for her extensive 
participation in what was ultimately successful prosecution of action); Enter. Energy Corp. v. 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240, 250–51 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (permitting similar 
awards).  
83. We asked the general counsel of one leading institutional investor that has acted as lead 
plaintiff in a number of cases how much time a lead plaintiff needs to spend on an “average” case.  
See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51.  He answered that in securities class actions there 
are several stages to the case that can take significant amounts of in-house personnel’s time.  In 
stage one, the institutional investor must make its initial decision about whether to file a motion to 
be named lead plaintiff and then to select lead counsel.  He estimated that this part of case 
management would take twenty to one hundred hours of its legal staff’s time and two to ten hours 
of its investment staff’s time.  If the institution is selected as lead plaintiff—an outcome that is 
highly likely—it would thereafter assist class counsel in preparing and filing an amended 
complaint.  To be sure, class counsel would probably do most of this work, but in-house counsel 
would still spend five to ten hours, and the investment staff would devote an additional two to 
five hours at this point. 
 Institutions must also spend significant amounts of time helping class counsel brief important 
motions.  This work is performed almost entirely by the legal staff of the institution, taking 
anywhere from five to fifty hours of time.  The investment staff’s involvement in this stage would 
be minimal, totaling less than two hours.  Discovery in all its various aspects can also absorb in-
house legal staff’s time as well as that of the investment staff.  This general counsel thought that 
legal staff would spend ten to fifty hours on discovery, and the investment staff would be required 
to do about an equal amount of work. 
 If the case proceeds to the point of negotiating a settlement, then both in-house legal staff and 
investment staff are typically involved.  These negotiations can be quite short or very protracted, 
making estimate ranges here fairly broad.  Here, our source estimated that legal staff might put in 
ten to two hundred hours of time, while investment staff would be needed less (only one to ten 
hours).  If the case actually goes toward trial, the institutional investor’s staff will be heavily 
involved.  Legal staff could be employed full time for several weeks with trial preparation.  
Investment staff, while less needed, could still spend several days helping with these preparations.  
All of this preparation time would be required even though the trial itself is very unlikely to be 
held since almost no federal securities class actions go to trial.  See Bernard S. Black, Brian R. 
Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability 7 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n, Working 
Paper No. 11, Apr. 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art11 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (showing 1,557 federal securities cases settling out of 2,930 cases filed 
from 1991 to June 2003). 
 Finally, according to our source, the lead plaintiff’s legal staff will need to engage in general 
oversight and communication activities throughout the case.  This can add up to an additional one 
to three hours a month of legal counsel’s time.  Over the course of an entire case, this might 
amount to a total of twenty to eighty hours of in-house legal staff time per lawsuit. 
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low to us, then the cost of a reasonable case management effort by an 
institutional investor lead plaintiff in an “average” case would total between 
$25,000 and $100,000.  Even though some institutional investors believe that 
they can double or even quadruple their recovery by serving as active lead 
plaintiffs, these are substantial upfront costs to bear relative to the incremental 
benefits institutions expect their involvement to yield.  Moreover, several of 
our survey respondents stated that they had very limited manpower to staff 
cases and therefore chose not to become involved as lead plaintiff in many 
cases. 
An individual investor, or even an aggregation of individuals, is not likely 
to engage in the extensive involvement described in the preceding paragraphs 
at each of many stages of litigation by an institution.  Our data base reflects 
that the individual investor is not a repeat player in the process as is the case 
with some public pension funds.  Moreover, the individual investor is not 
likely to have an internal staff to involve it in the monitoring assessments that 
occur at multiple stages of the suit’s life.  Hence, these monitoring costs are 
not sunk costs, as they are in large part with institutions, but rather require the 
individuals to devote new resources to the enterprise.  In light of these facts, 
individuals are likely to underinvest in monitoring.  We therefore do not 
believe it is likely that lead plaintiffs who are not such a financial institution 
are likely to produce gains that approach those associated with a lead plaintiff 
who is a financial institution.  We empirically test this hypothesis later in this 
study.84 
Finally, we would be remiss if we did not mention two other important 
obstacles to institutional investors becoming lead plaintiffs.  First, a number of 
our survey respondents noted the lack of information about the case at the very 
early stage of the litigation—when they are forced to decide whether to 
become lead plaintiffs—as a barrier to serving as class counsel.  In essence, 
PSLRA gives institutions a maximum of sixty days to make this choice, which 
essentially limits the information on which they base their decision to the 
complaint, the publicly available information about the company, and the size 
of their estimated loss.85  Sixty days appears to be a relatively brief time for 
institutional investors to inform themselves fully enough to decide whether to 
become a lead plaintiff, especially where the loss estimates generated at this 
stage can vary wildly. 
Second, many institutions have commercial relationships that may be 
jeopardized if they become lead plaintiffs.  Even though financial institutions 
are not monolithic in their missions or operations, many institutions’ managers 
 
84. See infra Part II.C. 
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) (requiring class members to move to serve as lead 
plaintiff within sixty days of notice of complaint); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) (same).  Given the 
type of damage models that they use, the plaintiffs’ lawyers that are trying to persuade institutions 
to become involved are likely to overestimate the amount of these losses, which further 
complicates the institutions’ situation. 
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face conflicts of interest when considering whether to become a lead 
plaintiff.86  Banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies—three of the five 
largest classes of financial institutions—are each vendors of financial services 
and products.  Their customers include the corporations and accounting firms 
who are the grist of securities class actions.  And, to the extent that public 
pension funds and endowments appear not to have the same conflicts as other 
types of institutions, those conflicts appear when the public pension fund or 
endowment depends on outside money managers who have such conflicts.87  
These relationships are jeopardized if the institution becomes the lead plaintiff 
in a class action focused on its customers or benefactors. 
As we have observed elsewhere,88 financial service providers are not 
eager to become, or to align themselves with, antagonists of their clientele.89  
This observation likely explains why our data contains no settlement where a 
bank, mutual fund, or insurance company has served as a lead plaintiff in a 
securities class action.  Our intuition is that such institutions are generally 
unwilling to lead the assault on executives who have issued misleading reports 
if such visibility could pose problems in selling financial services to other 
executives who likely share the view that most securities class action suits are 
strike suits.90  Consorting with “class action lawyers” does not win one friends 
in the executive suites of America or at the club.91  Furthermore, there is only 
the thinnest social divide between executives of banks, insurance companies, 
and mutual funds and executives of industrial firms.  These are groups of 
individuals who understand one another and who are aware of the price to be 
 
86. See Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 425–28 (explaining social and 
commercial forces that prevent banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies from stepping 
forward to become lead plaintiffs). 
87. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 596–97 
(1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity] (observing that some institutional investors 
suffer inherent conflicts of interest derivatively through their external advisors who face such 
conflicts). 
88. See Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 427–28. 
89. Thus, we find that many types of financial institutions are not themselves the proponents 
of a bylaw or other proposal that will alter the governance of their portfolio companies, although 
they will at times vote in favor of such a proposal that is advanced by another, less conflicted 
institution.  See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:  The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 883 (1992) (“A bank trust department may not make a 
shareholder proposal itself, but the trust department may be able to vote for a proposal by another 
institution, especially if corporate managers can’t easily discover how the trust department 
voted.”).  More pointedly, “for a conflicted institution, crossing the street in a crowd is safer than 
crossing alone.”  Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 87, at 606. 
90. We recognize that an institution may be averse to participating in individual class action 
recoveries if it believes that a particular case is just extorting money from a company.   
91. The same social and commercial forces that prevent banks, mutual funds, and insurance 
companies from stepping forward to be a lead plaintiff may also weaken the commitment of their 
managers to assure that the firm reaps the full advantage of securities class action litigation.  See 
Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 424 (finding in study of 118 securities class 
action settlements that 72% of potential claimants in settled class actions fail to submit their 
claims).  
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incurred by failing to honor that understanding.92  By default, therefore, it is 
the public or union pension fund that is most likely to serve as a lead plaintiff 
because it is the type of institution not likely to have such a commercial 
interest that would be jeopardized by aligning itself with the plaintiffs’ bar.93  
As we will see, these are the overwhelming majority of institutional investors 
that are appearing as lead plaintiffs in our sample.  Thus, there are distinct 
imputed costs to becoming a lead plaintiff when the institution is also a vendor 
of commercial products to those who may become the targets of future 
securities class actions. 
D.  Forces that Corrupt:  Strategies that Circumvent the Objective of the Lead 
Plaintiff Provision 
The broad objective of the PSLRA’s mechanism for selecting a lead 
plaintiff is to place a class member in the lead harness and thus make securities 
class actions less lawyer driven.  Because of practices described in this section, 
this objective, regretfully, may largely remain just a hope and not a reality. 
Plaintiff law firms competing to represent the class each have a significant 
financial stake in who the court selects as the suit’s lead plaintiff:  This 
selection customarily means the counsel representing the new lead plaintiff is 
appointed to be class counsel.  To be sure, the PSLRA does not require this 
result because the lead plaintiff provision expressly conditions selection of the 
class counsel on approval by the court.  Nevertheless, the courts regularly 
avoid any “shotgun marriage” between the lead plaintiff and a counsel not 
selected by the lead plaintiff.94  We can therefore understand that the winning 
strategy for the plaintiffs’ lawyer is to find and befriend an investor or group of 
investors who are likely to have substantial financial losses due to the 
defendant’s fraudulent acts. 
1.  “Pay-to-Play” Allegations. — The most obvious place to find such a 
high-loss investor is among the ranks of institutional investors.  As seen above, 
most institutions face commercial restraints on serving as lead plaintiff.  Two 
 
92. See William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley with Carolyn Kay Brancato, Fortune and 
Folly:  The Wealth and Power of Institutional Investing 230–31 (1992) (examining cultural 
identities that managers of institutions share with managers of their portfolio companies); cf. 
James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:  Psychological Foundations and 
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 83, 85–108 
(examining social and psychological forces, among which includes being of same social strata, 
that can impede director’s decision to sue another). 
93. Labor union shareholder activists often wear two hats, protecting their interests as 
shareholders but also furthering their interests as workers.  For further discussion of the potential 
conflicts of interest that may arise in these situations, and of labor union shareholder activism in 
general, see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:  
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018, 1074–84 (1998). 
94. See In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 733–35 (9th Cir. 2002) (deciding that selecting 
counsel through competitive bidding is inconsistent with PSLRA); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 
F.3d 201, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2001) (same). 
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important exceptions to these commercial restraints are public and labor 
pension funds.  In theory, a priori considerations that should guide institutions 
in selecting a law firm to serve as class counsel include the firm’s reputation 
and the formula for determining fees to be awarded counsel for any success in 
the suit. 
Dimming this idealistic vision of selecting lead counsel are numerous 
reports of “pay-to-play” practices pursued by some large plaintiffs’ law 
firms.95  A case in point is the Cendant litigation.  The lead plaintiffs in 
Cendant, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the New York 
City Pension Funds, and the New York State Common Retirement Fund 
(NYSCRF), selected Barrack, Rodos and Bacine (BRB) and Bernstein Litowitz 
Berger & Grossman LLP (BLBG) as lead counsel.  An elected official, New 
York State Comptroller H. Carl McCall, had sole responsibility with respect to 
all matters related to NYSCRF, and it was his office that urged the selection of 
BRB and BLBG as lead counsel.  But Comptroller McCall had received 
approximately $100,000 in campaign contributions from three plaintiffs’ law 
firms between 1999 and 2001—the relevant period for having selected and 
retained counsel in the matter.  Two of those contributing law firms were the 
two firms selected to be counsel in the Cendant litigation.96  Ultimately 
counsel was awarded attorneys’ fees of $55 million in connection with the $3.2 
billion settlement of the suit.97  Not surprisingly, in 2002 it was estimated that 
BRB and BLBG, their partners, and their families made nearly $200,000 in 
campaign donations to McCall.98 
Recall that in Cendant, in response to an objection by a lawyer for another 
shareholder who was not selected as the lead plaintiff, the district court held an 
auction to choose counsel.99  The objector argued that both BRB and BLBG 
should be disqualified because they had made political contributions to 
McCall.100  The district court permitted both firms to represent the class, 
 
95. Cf. John R. Wilke, Nathan Koppel & Peter Sanders, Milberg Indicted on Charges Firm 
Paid Kickbacks, Wall St. J., May 19, 2006, at A1 (reporting federal indictment of nation’s largest 
securities class action firm for alleged “kick backs” to individuals who served as plaintiffs in 
securities class actions over twenty-year period). 
96. See Kevin McCoy, Campaign Contributions or Conflicts of Interest?, USA Today, Sept. 
11, 2001, at 1B.  The third law firm, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, was selected by 
McCall as lead counsel in the Global Crossings securities class action.  See Shaila K. Dewan, 
Donors to McCall Profit in Cases State Pursues Against Corporate Wrongdoers, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 14, 2002, at B4.  And McCall selected BRB and BLBG to represent the fund as lead 
plaintiff in another large class action, McKesson HBOC, Inc.  Id.  Since BRB is based in 
Philadelphia, its support of a public official of another state, who aspired only to office in that 
state, supports our unease that the purpose of BRB’s campaign contribution was driven by 
commercial and not civic objectives. 
97. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.N.J. 2003), aff’d, 404 F.3d 
173 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that $55 million in attorneys’ fees requested by lead counsel is “not 
clearly excessive”). 
98. See Dewan, supra note 96. 
99. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 270–72. 
100. See id. at 269. 
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provided they would agree to match the low bid.101  Not surprisingly, they 
agreed because the low bid they were asked to match was $75 million greater 
than the fee they had negotiated with the three lead plaintiffs.102 
Interestingly, McCall chose not to appeal the higher fee award; the appeal 
instead was brought by the New York City Pension Funds, for whom there 
were no reports of campaign contributions.  The Third Circuit reversed the 
award, remanded the case to the district court with suggestions that a lower 
figure was in order, and dealt obliquely with the possible corrupting influences 
of campaign contributions to McCall.103  The court suggested that “in cases 
where the court determines that a publicly-managed fund is the presumptively 
most adequate plaintiff, the court could properly require that the fund disclose 
any campaign contributions by the fund’s choice of counsel to any elected 
officials possessing direct oversight and authority over the fund.”104 
The odor of corruption surrounds more than Mr. McCall’s choice of 
counsel in Cendant and other instances when NYSCRF has been appointed 
lead plaintiff.105  Milberg Weiss, the leading securities class action plaintiffs’ 
firm, has repeatedly been mired in controversy over whether it secures the 
support of public institutions through political or other contributions to 
decisionmakers.106  And in a news account based on examination of campaign 
finance records in five states and two cities, reporters found not only a 
substantial increase in campaign contributions in Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and 
New York following the enactment of the PSLRA and its lead plaintiff 
provision, but a correlation between the contributing law firms and the funds’ 
selection of these firms to represent the fund as counsel in suits where the fund 
served as lead plaintiff.107 
 
101. See id. at 219–20 (discussing district court’s counsel selection process). 
102. See id. at 272 n.50. 
103. See id. at 220–21. 
104. Id. at 270 n.49 (emphasis added). 
105. See id. at 230–31.  In this regard, New York State Comptroller Alan Hevesi chose 
BRB and BLBG to represent the municipal pension system as lead plaintiff in the securities class 
action arising out of the accounting scandal of WorldCom.  In combination the two firms 
contributed $42,900 to Hevesi’s campaign.  See Editorial, Citigroup Wake-Up Call, N.Y. Sun, 
May 11, 2004, at 10. 
106. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Huge Class-Action Law Firm Splits After Dispute, N.Y. Sun, 
May 4, 2004, at 1 (reporting grand jury investigation of Milberg Weiss’s efforts to obtain 
business from Philadelphia city controller); N.Y.’s Milberg Weiss Faces 2nd Investigation, N.Y. 
Law., Feb. 27, 2002, at http://www.nylawyer.com/news/02/02/022702f.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (reporting grand jury investigation into whether Milberg Weiss 
representatives had made contributions to Philadelphia City Controller to secure appointments as 
lead counsel in securities class actions). 
107. See McCoy, supra note 96.  For example, Louisiana State Treasurer Ken Duncan, who 
oversaw the state retirement funds, received no contributions from securities class action law 
firms in his campaign in 1995, but four years later several such law firms were his biggest 
contributors.  Id.  He lost that election to John Kennedy, who, unlike Caesar’s wife, reported 
receiving a campaign contribution from a Boston law firm that Kennedy later selected to 
represent a Louisiana teachers’ pension fund in the lucrative settlement of a suit against Summitt 
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Plaintiffs’ side securities law firms are also said to have recently begun 
employing lobbyists to assist them in their efforts to obtain the lead counsel 
position.  Of course, many businesses in the United States hire lobbyists, and 
they are widely employed to engage in a broad variety of activities, such as 
fighting adverse legislation and promoting good public relations.  However, we 
were informed by several public pension fund officials that at least some of 
these lobbyists are engaged in efforts to persuade funds to assume the lead 
plaintiff position in securities fraud class actions and retain the law firm to act 
as lead counsel.  To determine the veracity of this claim, we decided to see 
how widespread this activity was amongst the leading plaintiffs’ law firms.  
We visited the lobbyist disclosure web sites for all fifty states to see if any of 
the best-known plaintiffs’ law firms had disclosed hiring lobbyists and, if so, 
how much they paid them.108  Our search turned up six states where the best-
known plaintiffs’ securities class action law firms109 had made such 
disclosures.110  Three law firms have disclosed hiring lobbyists:  Milberg 
Weiss,111 Abbey Gardy and Squitieri,112 and Bernstein Liebhard and 
 
Technology.  Id.  Similarly, Kennedy selected as counsel in the Gateway and Lucent cases a New 
York-based firm that had made a substantial contribution to his campaign.  Id. 
108. Where possible, we tracked down how much these firms paid their lobbyist in a given 
state using the information provided on that state’s website.  If the state’s website did not provide 
that information, we called the state agency to inquire whether that information was available 
from another source.  Each state agency that we called indicated that it does not track how much 
lobbyists are paid by their employer.  The poor accessibility and quality of the data that is 
available through some of these sites make it possible that we missed some firms.  We did not 
examine any of the U.S. territories, Puerto Rico, or Washington, D.C. 
109. We searched for sixteen law firms that are actively engaged in shareholder litigation.  
These firms were identified in an earlier study by one of the authors.  See Thompson & Thomas, 
supra note 6, at 186–87 tbl.12.  While these firms are not the only plaintiffs’ law firms bringing 
securities fraud class actions, they file a large percentage of these cases.  See id. at 186 & n.199. 
110. We began at the website for the Center for Public Integrity (CFPI).  See Ctr. for Pub. 
Integrity, http://www.publicintegrity.org/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).  The CFPI site 
contains links to the state agencies in every state that monitor lobbying efforts at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/information.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review).  This page also indicates whether a particular state tracks 
executive lobbyists, legislative lobbyists, or all lobbyists.  Using the links provided, we searched 
every state’s website for information on lobbyists and their employers.  Where possible, we 
downloaded any reports that provided information on lobbyists and their employers.  Then we 
searched those reports for the sixteen plaintiffs’ firms identified in our discussion.  Some states do 
not allow reports to be downloaded.  Instead, those states have search engines that allow 
searching of the lobbyist registration data.  In those states, we searched using their search engines.  
We also searched for lobbyist information in every state using the popular search engine Google, 
at http://www.google.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). 
111. See Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 2002 Employer Year-End Summary 15 (2002), 
available at http://www.state.ak.us/apoc/pdf/02empsum.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (disclosing $84,000 in 2002); Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 2003 Employer Year-End 
Summary 16 (2003), available at http://www.state.ak.us/apoc/pdf/03empYEsum.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (disclosing $84,000 in 2003); Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 2004 
Employer Year End Summary 15 (2004), available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/apoc/pdf/04empyesum.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(disclosing $21,000 in 2004); Cal. Sec’y of State, Lobbying Activity:  Milberg Weiss Bershad 
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Lifshitz.113 
To the extent that plaintiffs’ class action firms engage in this behavior, it 
appears to be just part of a larger tapestry of pay-to-play practices by law firms 
generally.114  This practice is not well regulated, even though the American 
Bar Association’s position is that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not accept a 
government legal engagement or an appointment by a judge if the lawyer or 
law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for the 
purpose of obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or 
appointment.”115  In addition to the obvious difficulty of proving in any 
disciplinary proceeding that a contribution was made for the avowed purpose 
of securing future appointment as lead counsel, the ABA’s position is further 
weakened because no state has made this statement a part of its rules of 
professional conduct.  What would surely be more effective would be a total 
bar to the appointment of a law firm that has made a political contribution to a 
governmental official who could influence the choice of counsel to represent a 
governmental fund in a securities suit.  Such an approach has analogues in 
other areas, with a virtually identical rule adopted by the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board to govern relationships between broker-dealers who 
underwrite municipal securities and the elected officials who select the 
underwriters.116  An equally well-informed response is that followed in a few 
states that have placed the counsel-selecting decision in the hands of 
nonpartisan boards, and not in the hands of elected officials.117  A third, 
 
Hynes & Lerach, at http://cal-
access.ss.ca.gov/Lobbying/Employers/Detail.aspx?id=1143713&session=2003&view=activity 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (disclosing $181,000 in 2003–
2004). 
112. See N.Y. State Temp. Comm’n on Lobbying, Client Semi-Annual Report:  Abbey 
Gardy, at https://www.nytscol.org/Data_CSRQuery.asp?ID=1801&CSRID=1199 (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (disclosing $30,000 in 2003). 
113. See Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, supra note 110 (providing links to Arkansas, Illinois, and 
Ohio websites). 
114. See Michael Higgins, Pondering “Pay-to-Play”:  ABA Scrutinizes Link Between 
Campaign Contributions and Legal Work, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 96, 96 (offering as one of 
several examples that thirty-three lawyers, whose firms together held approximately 70% of 
state’s bond work, each pledged $25,000 to reelect Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge).  Similar 
connections appear to hold in New York and New Jersey.  See id. 
115. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.6 (2006) (emphasis added). 
116. See Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-37(b)(i) (2005), available at 
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/rules/ruleg37.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(prohibiting broker-dealers from engaging in municipal securities business for issuer if broker-
dealer, its associates, or committee controlled by broker-dealer has made political contributions to 
official of issuer within two years).  See generally Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of “Pay-to-
Play” and the Influence of Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 1999 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 489 (discussing rise and fall of “pay-to-play” and how dealers who make 
political contributions can influence elected officials to select them for municipal bond business).  
117. See Diana B. Henriques, Conflict over Conflicts:  Class-Action Lawyers Defend Their 
Political Contributions, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1998, at D1 (detailing, for example, that State of 
Wisconsin Investment Board created four-member nonpartisan panel consisting of its assistant 
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perhaps more easily implemented, response tracks the lines suggested by the 
Third Circuit in the Cendant litigation:118  Federal courts could routinely 
require the disclosure of all campaign contributions made by the plaintiffs’ 
counsel to any official associated with an institutional investor applying for a 
lead plaintiff position.  The court could then decide if these contributions 
should influence its decision about the appointment of lead counsel. 
2.  Who Wins the Beauty Contest? — When the contest to be designated 
the lead plaintiff is between a financial institution, an individual, a group of 
individuals, or a nonfinancial institution, the courts with great consistency 
prefer the financial institution over others.119  This demonstrative preference is 
driven largely by the institution being the single claimant with the largest loss.  
Despite this recognized strong preference on the part of the courts and the 
potential benefits of financial institutions becoming a lead plaintiff, financial 
institutions have not swollen the ranks of those petitioning to be a lead 
plaintiff.120  Two early studies illustrate this point.  The first, an SEC study of 
 
legal counsel, in-house investment manager, representative of Attorney General, and local lawyer 
noted for litigation experience). 
118. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 270 n.49 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that 
court should inquire of publicly managed fund seeking to be designated as lead plaintiff whether 
contributions have been made and, if so, how fund selected contributing counsel as suit’s 
counsel). 
119. Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Tex. 1997), addresses potential 
conflicts posed by selecting as lead plaintiff an institution that has the largest claim and also 
continues to own shares in the defendant corporation.  Gluck concludes that, even though a 
conflict may cause the institution to prefer a more moderate settlement than would be preferred if 
the petitioner did not continue as stockholder, this conflict is not disabling because Congress 
envisioned that longer term corporate interests would be taken into consideration by the lead 
plaintiff in guiding terms of the settlement.  Id. at 547–49. 
120. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra note 11, at 7 (documenting that institutional 
investors represent only 14% of lead plaintiffs in recent securities litigation); Coffee, Litigation 
Governance, supra note 9, at 806 n.7 (explaining that few institutional investors are willing to 
serve as lead plaintiffs and concluding that costs of such role likely exceed benefits for 
institutional investors); John P. Coffey & John C. Browne, The Results Are in . . . Class Action 
Settlements Are Significantly Higher When Institutional Investors Act as Lead Plaintiffs, 
Institutional Investor Advoc. (Bernstein Litowitz Berge & Grossman, New York, N.Y.), Second 
Quarter 2004, at 3, 3, available at http://www.blbglaw.com/advocate/adv2004Q2.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (“Less than a decade ago, most institutional investors would have 
scoffed at a suggestion that they seek to be appointed as lead plaintiff in a securities class action 
lawsuit.”).  Despite the probable positive effects institutions can have on settlements, there is no 
definitive legal compulsion that they so involve themselves.  See, e.g., Craig C. Martin & Mathew 
H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 Bus. Law. 
1381, 1404–08 (2001) (reviewing fiduciary duties of pension fund managers without identifying 
obligation to become lead plaintiff, but emphasizing obligations of managers once becoming lead 
plaintiff). 
 There is some evidence that recently institutional investors have become increasingly 
interested in becoming lead plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 61–62 
(explaining that, due to adoption of lead plaintiff provision, “[a]n increasing number of 
institutional investors are seeking appointments as lead plaintiff”); Adam C. Pritchard, Should 
Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform 8 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 471, 2003), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa471.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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the first year’s experiences under PSLRA, found that in the 105 securities 
fraud class actions the Commission’s staff examined, institutional investors 
moved to become lead plaintiffs in only eight cases.121  Later findings indicate 
that, in 1997, institutional investors appeared as lead plaintiffs in securities 
fraud class actions in only nine out of 175 cases examined.122  If we add the 
results of these two studies together, we find that over the two year interval 
1996–1997, institutions sought lead counsel status in only seventeen out of 280 
cases—only about 6% of the cases studied. 
With the realm of prospective financial institutions to serve as lead 
plaintiffs being largely limited to public or labor pension funds, a far more 
prevalent strategy attorneys pursue to become class counsel is to assemble a 
group of investors who, hopefully, have the largest aggregate financial loss 
among those petitioning to be selected as lead plaintiff.  The PSLRA explicitly 
refers to the lead plaintiff as a “person or group of persons,”123 even though 
the legislative history of the PSLRA is fairly compelling that Congress’s vision 
of the lead plaintiff was a nonaggregated large holder—namely a financial 
institution.124  This may well cause us to wonder if “persons,” as used in the 
act, poorly expresses Congress’s vision because the plural usage was never 
intended to include natural persons but institutions. 
Considering that the weakness the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision 
sought to address was the class representative’s poor incentives to monitor the 
suit’s prosecution because of a small economic incentive, this interpretation 
becomes more compelling.  It is difficult for us to understand how this concern 
is overcome by aggregation of claimants, especially when each member of the 
group has a relatively small claim.  Indeed, aggregation likely makes the 
problem worse, not better.  The aggregation of several small claimants carries 
forward the problems present when a single small claimant is the suit’s 
 
(“[Due to the PSLRA,] institutional investors are now starting to step forward in greater numbers 
to take charge of securities fraud class actions.”).  Prior to 2002, the support for this claim was 
largely anecdotal and based on citations to particular instances in which institutions have 
petitioned to be named lead counsel.  During this time period, out of all of the potential 
institutions that could act as lead plaintiffs, “only public pension funds, and a limited number of 
union-related institutions, [had] been willing to serve as lead plaintiffs.”  Coffee, Litigation 
Governance, supra note 9, at 806 n.7.  Private pension funds and mutual funds are conspicuously 
absent from the lead plaintiff positions.  See id. 
121.  Office of the Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and Congress, supra note 54. 
122. See Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 9, at 807 n.7 (citing Elayne Demby, 
Ducking Lead Plaintiff Status, Plan Sponsor, May 1999, at http://www.plansponsor.com (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review)). 
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2000) (emphasis added). 
124. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 (lamenting that pre-PSLRA system “works to prevent institutional 
investors from selecting counsel or serving as lead plaintiff[s]” and expressing hope that 
“increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit shareholders 
and assist courts”); S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 
(stating hope that legislation will increase role of institutional investors in securities class 
actions). 
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representative and also adds a new problem:  When several individuals are the 
suit’s representatives, they face a collective action problem in coordinating 
their monitoring of the class counsel.125  Moreover, we cannot envision that a 
member of a group will have a stronger incentive to monitor the conduct of the 
suit than she would have as a single class representative, so there is every 
reason to expect a good deal of free riding behavior within such a group.  Thus, 
the aggregation approach, even though quite well received among the courts, 
strikes us as being inconsistent with the rationale of the lead plaintiff provision.  
For the reasons stated above, aggregation likely yields a lead plaintiff that has 
no greater incentive than that of an individual investor whose loss equals that 
of the group’s largest member. 
Reflecting on over ten years’ experience with the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff 
provision raises fascinating questions about whether its impact has been 
positive.  There is no doubt that political officers benefit from law firms’ quest 
for a public pension fund that will dispense its favor by first stepping forward 
to be a lead plaintiff and, if selected, next nominating as the class counsel a law 
firm that is a patron of its political officers.  But is this beneficial to either the 
process or society more generally?  Most certainly the PSLRA was not enacted 
to create further angst over how political fundraising might compromise the 
judgment and trust of elected officials.  Similarly, just as it is problematic to 
believe that an individual investor with a small financial stake in a class 
action’s outcome will be a vigilant monitor of the suit’s prosecution and 
ultimate settlement, it is equally doubtful that a group of individuals will be 
more diligent than the single individual class representative.  Admittedly, our 
misgivings about each of these outcomes are based solely on reason alone.  But 
following Holmes’s admonition,126 we believe the real answer to this question 
lies in experience, not logic.  Accordingly, we now turn to the empirical 
evidence we have gathered that bears not just on the contribution, if any, made 
by lead plaintiffs but also on whether the type of lead plaintiff matters. 
II.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF 
PROVISION 
The empirical evidence concerning the lead plaintiff provision that has 
 
125. See, e.g., In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109, 1111 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001) (requiring preexisting relationship for institutions and individuals collectively to serve 
as lead plaintiff, even though group’s alleged losses exceeded $14 million); In re Landry’s 
Seafood Rest., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H-99-1948, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7005, at *15–*16 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 30, 2000) (denying aggregation by reasoning, in part, that too loose affiliation among 
class representatives will result in manipulation by attorneys); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 
F. Supp. 2d 803, 815–16 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (denying aggregation because coordination costs of 
members with no prior relationship would render effective monitoring of counsel unlikely). 
126. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been 
experience.”). 
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been marshaled to date in the academic literature has been very limited.127  In 
the remainder of this study, we contribute to this body of knowledge by 
analyzing publicly available electronic databases of court decisions, 
proprietary databases from securities claims administrators,128 and information 
that we collected about securities fraud class actions. 
A.  Courts’ Preference for Institutional Investors in Disputed Situations 
Courts have been asked to decide numerous controversies over which 
investors should be selected as lead plaintiff.  In order to determine 
systematically how institutional investors have fared in the battle to be named 
lead plaintiff, we conducted a survey of all court decisions about the selection 
of a lead plaintiff.  We searched the Westlaw and Lexis electronic libraries for 
all opinions relating to the court’s appointment of a lead plaintiff for the time 
period from January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2004.  We found 129 decisions 
in which a court was asked to appoint a lead plaintiff.  We then read them and 
classified the decisions in Table 1 below.  Included within the data in Table 1 
are a number of cases where there is only one petitioner for the position of lead 
plaintiff.  Thus, among the fifty cases in the category “Cases Without an 
Institutional Investor Petitioner,” there are seventeen cases where there was 
only one petitioner.  Furthermore, in the category “Single/Multiple Institutions 
Selected Over Individuals/Groups, or No Competing Petitioner,” there are 
seven cases where only a single institution applied for the lead plaintiff 
position. 
Table 1:  Outcomes of Judicial Decisions Appointing Lead Plaintiff 
 
Type of Investors  Number  
of Cases 
Cases Without an Institutional Investor Petitioner 50 
Cases with Multiple Institutional Investors Petitioning: 
Single Institution Selected 
38 
Single/Multiple Institutions Selected over 
Individuals/Groups, or No Competing Petitioner 
24 
Institution and Individual Selected over Competing 8 
 
127. In addition to our work, two recent working papers by other legal academics will help 
to fill this gap.  See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter?  The 
Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1 (N.Y.U. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-08, 2005), available at 
http://www.luc.edu/law/faculty/facworkshops/fisch_do_institutions_matter.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (finding that public pension fund lead plaintiffs are correlated with higher 
class recoveries than other types of lead plaintiffs, including private institutional lead plaintiffs); 
Perino, supra note 42, at 34 (finding that public pension funds negotiate lower attorneys’ fees than 
other types of lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions). 
128. For a more detailed discussion of the data we obtained from claims administrators, see 
Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table, supra note 5, at 871–74. 
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Individuals/Groups/Institutions 
Cases with Institutional Investor(s) and Competing 
Individual/Group of Individuals Petitioning:  Individual or 
Group Selected 
9 
Total Number of Cases 129 
 
This data reflects the courts’ preference for institutional investors as lead 
plaintiffs.  Courts found in their favor in the vast majority of cases in which an 
institutional investor was competing for the position of lead counsel.  
However, there are two important caveats to this statement.  First, courts were 
willing to select groups of individuals over institutions in situations where the 
institutions did not have large shareholdings in the company that was the 
subject of the litigation, especially where the court exhibited concerns about 
the typicality of the institutional investor as a class representative.  Second, in 
several cases courts accepted groups of institutions and individuals over their 
competitors where they found such groups to have the largest stake in the 
defendant company.  Both of these situations appear to reflect continued 
judicial acceptance of groups as effective monitors of plaintiffs’ counsel in 
securities fraud class actions, a preference which we have earlier noted seems 
questionable to us. 
B.  Size of Claim and Type of Lead Plaintiffs 
In a pair of earlier studies of claims filing behavior in securities fraud 
class actions, we obtained confidential data concerning the size of 
stockholdings for a large group of securities fraud class action settlements 
covering the time period 1996–1998.129  Using this data, we identified the lead 
plaintiffs, the size of their claims in the settlements, and the percentage of all 
claims that these institutions held in thirty-five post-PSLRA cases.  Table 2 
below presents this information for four different types of lead plaintiffs:  
public pension funds, other institutional lead plaintiffs, single individuals, and 
groups of individuals.  The sample size is small, and the cases included are 
selected solely on the basis of having complete data, so the observations made 
below must be viewed as descriptive. 
 
Table 2:  Lead Plaintiff Claims in Securities Fraud Class Actions 
 
 
129. See id.; Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 421–24 tbl.1 (reporting 
purchase activity and settlement data during class period). 
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Type of 
Lead 
Plaintiff 
Numbe
r  
of 
Cases 
Average 
Dollar 
Amount 
of Lead 
Plaintiff’s 
Claim130 
Average 
Total Dollar 
Amount of 
Settlement 
Claims131 
Average 
Percentage 
of Lead 
Plaintiff’s 
Claim Out 
of Total 
Settlement 
Claims132 
Average 
Total 
Settlement 
Amount 
(Including 
Valuation 
of 
Securities)
133 
 
Public 
Pension 
Fund 
Lead 
Plaintiff 
3 9,217,290 228,956,932  4.025% 17,183,333 
Other 
Type of 
Institutio
nal Lead 
Plaintiff 
2 505,154 269,574,988  0.18% 28,150,000 
Individu
al Lead 
Plaintiff 
  21 52,461  45,238,397  0.11% 6,863,028 
Groups  
of 
Individu
als 
9 349,808  32,785,285  1.066% 8,068,841 
 
130. The values in this column are calculated by aggregating the claims of each lead 
plaintiff and then calculating the average value.  For example, for public pension fund lead 
plaintiffs, the claims of the three funds were $7,040,077; $16,709,600; and $3,902,195, for the 
three cases in this category.  The average of these three cases is $9,217,290.  However, for the 
groups of individuals category, we treated each group as a single observation and made 
calculations on a per group basis. 
131. The values in this column are calculated by aggregating the total settlement claims for 
each separate case and then calculating an average value for the category.  For example, in the 
public pension fund lead plaintiff category, the total amount of claims in the three cases was 
$25,633,658; $62,681,470; and $598,555,670, respectively.  The average of these three values is 
$228,956,932.  With the groups of individuals category, we treated each group as a single 
observation and calculated values on a per group basis. 
132. The values in this column are calculated by dividing the value in the “Average Dollar 
Amount of Lead Plaintiff’s Claim” column by the value in the “Average Total Dollar Amount of 
Settlement Claims” column. 
133. For this column, we added together the actual dollar settlement amount for each case in 
the category, then divided by the number of observations in the category.  For instance, for the 
public pension fund lead plaintiff category the dollar settlement amounts were $14,500,000; 
$21,150,000; and $15,900,000, respectively.  The average for these three cases is $17,183,333. 
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Beginning with the public pension fund cases, in two of these actions the 
lead plaintiff was the largest stakeholder in the case, holding over 25% of the 
claims made in the case.  These cases are indicative of the type of lead plaintiff 
that Congress envisioned when it enacted this provision.  The third case also 
featured a lead plaintiff with a large dollar stake in the litigation ($3.9 million), 
but, given the extremely large settlement size, this plaintiff held a relatively 
small percentage (0.65%) of the total claims made in the case. 
Each of these lead plaintiffs had at least several million dollars at stake in 
the litigation.  Such large claimants may be able to justify incurring substantial 
monitoring costs if they will receive potentially larger benefits in any 
settlement.  For example, if a lead plaintiff incurs between $25,000 and 
$100,000 in monitoring costs134 as a result of taking on that responsibility, this 
would only represent about 0.25% to 1% of the three institutions’ average total 
losses ($9,217,290) in these cases.  For an institution engaging ex ante in a 
cost-benefit analysis of the value of the lead plaintiff position, this suggests 
that even a slightly optimistic assessment of the increased settlement value 
could result in a positive decision. 
The economics of actively monitoring class counsel are more problematic 
for the two other institutional investors that have acted as lead plaintiffs.  The 
first case involved a single institutional investor (an insurance company) where 
the lead plaintiff’s total stake in the litigation was so small ($40,000) that it 
could rationally only support the absolute minimum amount of monitoring 
possible.  In the second case, where the lead plaintiffs were an institutional 
investor (a labor fund) joined by an individual investor, the potential for 
monitoring was a bit more promising, although the size of their individual 
stakes were correspondingly smaller than in the other cases previously 
discussed.135 
Next, we consider the minimum size of claim that it would make sense to 
pursue.  First, we estimate conservatively that there was an approximately 10% 
average recovery rate for losses in securities fraud settlements during this time 
period.136  Thus, if an institution had a $1 million claim, it would expect to 
 
134. These costs will vary substantially depending on the case and the level of monitoring 
by the institution.  One well-known institutional investor estimated that, in an “average” case, an 
institution incurs between $25,000 and $100,000 of unreimbursed staff time actively monitoring 
the cases in which it is lead plaintiff.  See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51; see also supra 
note 83 and accompanying text (describing basis for this estimate). 
135. As we discussed more fully above, we believe that there are serious collective action 
problems with allowing aggregation of lead plaintiffs.  See supra Part I.D.2. 
136. For our sample in this study, we found that the average is 12.7% for the complete 
sample, 13.5% in the pre-PSLRA sample, and 12.3% in the post-PSLRA sample.  However, for 
purposes of illustration, we use the more conservative 10% value.  Compare this approach with 
Alison Beard, Shareholders Demand Their Day in Court, Fin. Times, July 11, 2002, at 28 
(summarizing Cornerstone Research study finding that plaintiffs are recovering 5.1% of total 
damages post-PSLRA), and Wager & Ward, supra note 23, at 18 (“Median settlement is less than 
6 percent of investors’ alleged losses.”).  The enormous divergence among damage estimates in 
securities fraud class actions may arise because of differences in their underlying assumptions.  
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recover about $100,000 from this claim.  If we assume that an institution can 
double this recovery rate by taking an active lead plaintiff role, then this would 
generate an additional $100,000 in value on a $1 million claim.  However, 
even this may not be a sufficient incentive to overcome the uncertainty of the 
expected benefits of being an active lead plaintiff.  In any event, this analysis 
suggests that a minimum claim size of $1 million is necessary for an institution 
to give serious consideration to becoming a lead plaintiff.  Risk-averse 
institutions might choose a higher multiple to be sure of recouping their 
costs137 or to allocate scarce administrative resources more efficiently.138 
For the single individual lead plaintiffs, we see that these class 
representatives have small dollar and percentage stakes in their respective 
cases.  However, we suspect that competition, or potential competition, for this 
role today has resulted in the appointment of individual lead plaintiffs with 
larger stakes than was seen earlier.  It seems apparent that these claimants 
cannot be realistically expected to engage in costly monitoring of class 
counsel. 
Finally, for the groups of individuals acting as lead plaintiffs, we observe 
that the average dollar size of the group of claims is larger than with the 
individual lead plaintiffs.  However, the size of the average individual claim 
for all group members is only $89,950.139  While this is larger than the amount 
reported for individual lead plaintiffs, it is well below the level where we 
would expect significant monitoring of class counsel.  Also, these groups must 
overcome greater coordination problems in negotiating with and monitoring 
class counsel. 
We conclude that the evidence we have presented, which is admittedly for 
a very small sample of cases, provides some support for the idea that public 
pension fund lead plaintiffs have the most potential to improve client 
monitoring of class counsel. 
C.  Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision 
To supplement the above analysis, we empirically test several hypotheses 
about the possible impact of the lead plaintiff provision.  Our data set of 388 
class actions was assembled from a variety of sources, including various 
claims administrators, a private consulting firm that provides litigation support 
 
For a discussion of our methodology and its underlying assumptions, see Cox & Thomas, SEC 
Heuristics, supra note 8, at 768 n.100. 
137. A risk-averse institution will want to recover more than the amount of its actual 
expenses to compensate itself for bearing the added uncertainty and costs of being an active lead 
plaintiff. 
138. One institutional investor has told us that because of staffing limits, it can only take on 
one or two cases at a time.  To focus on the biggest impact cases, its threshold claim for 
considering a lead plaintiff position is $7 million.  See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51. 
139. We calculated the average claim for each of the individual groups and then averaged 
the averages. 
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for securities fraud suits, and information about settlements obtained from 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).140 
1.  Descriptive Statistics. — Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our 
sample.  Panel A separates the 388 cases in our sample141 into pre-PSLRA and 
post-PSLRA cases, with the post-PSLRA cases broken into five categories of 
lead plaintiff.  Panel B, sorting cases by year of filing, shows that the vast bulk 
of cases were filed between 1993 and 2002.142 
 
 Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A Description Count Percent143 
Type of Lead Plaintiff  Pre-PSLRA Cases 128 33.0 
1 Single Institution 34 8.8 
2 Group of Individuals 106 27.3 
3 Institution-Individuals 12 3.1 
4 Single Individual 50 12.9 
5 Entity 58 15.0 
Total All Types of Lead Plaintiffs 388 100 
Panel B Year Complaint Filed Count Percent 
 1989–1992 14 3.6 
 1993–1995 109 28.3 
 1996–1999 180 46.8 
 2000–2002 82 21.3 
 Total 385 100 
 
Roughly one-third of the sample is comprised of pre-PSLRA settlements, 
 
140. We would like to thank ISS, the National Economic Research Associates (NERA), and 
several claims administrators (who requested anonymity) for their willingness to share this data. 
141. We excluded cases where the only defendant was an accounting firm and it was not 
possible to identify the firm that was the auditor’s client.  One potential impact of this is to reduce 
the settlement amount recovered in cases involving their audit clients because the accounting 
firms’ contribution to the settlement would be excluded.  However, there were only four of these 
settlements. 
142. While we are missing the exact date of three settlements, we can nevertheless classify 
them as pre- or post-PSLRA because we have other information about the case, such as the dates 
of the class period. 
143. We rounded these values off to the nearest tenth of a percent.  As a result, the total 
does not add up to exactly 100%. 
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while the remaining two-thirds are from the post-PSLRA period.  For the post-
PSLRA cases, Category 1 (single institutional lead plaintiff)144 and Category 3 
(institution and one or more individuals) are frequently combined for analytical 
purposes under the general rubric of “Institutional Lead Plaintiff.”  Together, 
these two groups make up slightly less than 18% of our post-PSRLA sample 
(forty-six cases), or nearly 12% of the entire sample.  Groups of individuals 
constitute the largest single type of lead plaintiff in the sample, comprising 
nearly 41% of the post-PSLRA settlements (27.3% overall) or 106 cases.  
Individuals and entities145 make up the rest of the cases with 12.9% (fifty 
cases) and 22% (fifty-eight cases), respectively, of the post-PSLRA data set. 
For the cases in the sample, Table 4 describes settlement amounts in 
thousands of dollars, cutting the sample into pre- and post-PSLRA cases (Panel 
A), post-PSLRA cases by type of lead plaintiff (Panel B), and institutional lead 
plaintiffs versus other groups (Panel C).  Panel A shows that pre-PSLRA cases 
have an average settlement value of about $10 million and a median settlement 
value of $5.5 million.  In comparison, post-PSLRA cases in our sample have a 
much larger mean value for settlements, although they have about the same 
median value.  Differences in these means and medians are not statistically 
significant at traditional levels.146 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
In Panel B, we see that Categories 1 and 3 exhibit mean settlements of 
more than $37 million (median $20.75 million) and $90 million (median 
$20.075 million), respectively.  By comparison, the total settlement values 
displayed for groups of individuals, single individuals, and entities do not 
appear very different from that observed prior to the passage of the PSLRA. 
 
144. “Institutional lead plaintiff” as used in our analysis of the sample refers to a lead 
plaintiff that could clearly be identified as a financial institution in the classic sense of an 
insurance company, bank, pension fund, mutual fund, endowment, or foundation.  As we 
reviewed documents to identify the suit’s plaintiff, we removed from such classification natural 
persons or entities that from their title did not identify the entity as fitting within one of these 
categories. 
145. “Entities” are defined as cases where there is no identifiable financial institution or 
pension fund, but we see a lead plaintiff that is not a natural person.  Some examples would be 
partnerships and individual trusts.  Some of the cases in this category also have named individuals 
as co-lead plaintiffs.  We have, therefore, confined financial institutions to the classic description 
(i.e., banks, pension and mutual funds, insurers, foundations, and endowments) out of necessity 
since there is not publicly available information by which we could determine if any entity was 
likely of a size equal to what Congress envisioned when it contemplated the lead plaintiff 
provision would best be used by “institutional” investors. 
146. To preserve the readability of these summary statistics, we do not provide p-values in 
all tables that present summary statistics of the data.  Instead we discuss the most important 
equality hypotheses in the text and support them with the appropriate p-values. 
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Panel C illustrates starkly that institutional investor cases exhibit much 
larger settlements.  When we test for statistical significance, comparing panels 
A and C, we find that settlements involving an institutional investor lead 
plaintiff are statistically larger than those for the pre-PSLRA cases and for 
other groups post-PSLRA.  However, the mean and median of the pre-PSLRA 
cases are not statistically different from those in all noninstitutional investor 
post-PSLRA cases.  This suggests the PSLRA’s impact on settlements may be 
limited to cases involving institutional lead plaintiffs. 
One possible explanation for this result might be that institutional 
investors appear in bigger, higher quality cases.  To investigate this hypothesis, 
we look first at whether institutional investors appear as lead plaintiffs in cases 
where more investors are harmed.  As a proxy for the number of investors 
harmed, we use the length of the class period because it should be correlated 
with the number of investors trading in the security during the alleged fraud.  
Table 5 presents data on the length of the class period for the different types of 
lead plaintiffs, with the bottom row providing information on all institutional 
lead plaintiffs. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
Table 5 shows that institutional lead plaintiffs appear in cases with 
statistically longer class periods.  We find that there is no significant difference 
between the length of class periods for the pre-PSLRA cases and Categories 2, 
4, and 5 of the post-PSLRA cases.  This again suggests that only the 
institutional lead plaintiff cases are different. 
Looking deeper at the question of why institutional investor lead plaintiffs 
obtain better settlements, Table 6 provides data about the market capitalization 
of defendant firms in securities fraud class actions.  Larger companies have 
more resources to pay settlements and a larger trading volume that can lead to 
greater damage claims.  The data shows the same pattern as in the previous two 
tables:  Institutional lead plaintiffs sue significantly larger companies than all 
other groups of lead plaintiffs, and the sizes of defendants sued in pre-PSLRA 
and post-PSLRA cases are not statistically different. 
 
Table 6:  Market Capitalization of Defendant Companies (millions of dollars) 
Plaintiff Type Mean Median # of observations 
Pre-PSLRA 930 185 121 
Post-PSLRA 3,345 223 230 
(1) Institution 4,482 1,782 28 
(2) Group of Individuals 1,487 189 94 
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(3) Institution-Individuals 36,262 10,753 11 
(4) Single Individual 413 184 46 
(5) Entity 1,693 207 51 
Total 2,513 215 351 
Institutional Lead Plaintiffs:  Categories 1 & 3 13,446 1,875 39 
 
A third possible explanation for institutional investors’ greater settlements 
is that they bring cases with greater damages.  Damage calculations in 
securities fraud cases involve complex estimations of the amount of the 
shareholders’ provable losses.  Using a model we developed earlier for 
estimating provable losses,147 we calculated these values for each case in our 
sample. 
 
Table 7:  Estimated Provable Losses (millions of dollars) 
 
 In Table 7, Panel A shows estimated provable losses for different 
categories of lead plaintiffs, while Panel B compares these losses for 
institutions with pre-PSLRA cases and all other post-PSLRA cases.  Panel A 
demonstrates that institutional lead plaintiffs appear in the cases with the 
largest estimated provable losses:  Both the means and medians for the two 
institutional groups are statistically greater than for the other groups at all 
 
147. See Cox & Thomas, SEC Heuristics, supra note 8, at 768 n.100. 
Table 7:  Panel A Mean Median # of observations 
Pre-PSLRA 380.4 57.1 128 
Post-PSLRA 982.2 131.4 260 
(1) Institution 3123.9 417.1 34 
(2) Group of Individuals 380.8 91.8 106 
(3) Institution-Individuals 6,352.8 1,817.8 12 
(4) Single Individual 197.8 76.1 50 
(5) Entity 391.0 148.5 58 
Total 783.7 91.1 388 
Table 7:  Panel B Mean Median # of observations 
Pre-PSLRA 380.2 57.1 128 
Institutional Lead Plaintiff:  Groups 1 & 3 3,966.2 492.2 46 
All Other Lead Plaintiffs Post-PSLRA 340.9 91.8 214 
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conventional levels. 
Casual scrutiny of the remaining categories shows that cases brought by 
entity lead plaintiffs seem to be the largest, while single individuals bring the 
smallest cases on average.  Pre-PSLRA cases have the lowest median provable 
loss.  Panel B reinforces this message. 
These descriptive statistics demonstrate that institutional lead plaintiffs 
bring the largest cases in the sample in terms of provable losses of the class.  
Moreover, our data shows that there are no significant differences between 
average provable losses in cases filed pre-PSLRA and those filed by the 
remaining categories of lead plaintiffs.  The medians, however, are statistically 
different at the 5% level. 
Our final set of descriptive statistics is in Table 8, which compares the 
ratio of settlement amounts to provable losses.  In essence, this table reports 
the percentage of the estimated losses suffered by the class members that was 
recouped through the settlement. 
 
Table 8:  Ratio of Settlement Amount to Provable Losses (%) 
 
Plaintiff Type Mean Median # of observations 
Pre-PSLRA 13.5% 9.6% 128 
Post-PSLRA 12.3% 5.1% 260 
(1) Institution 5.8% 4.1% 34 
(2) Group of Individuals 14.2% 5.7% 106 
(3) Institution-Individuals 6.1% 3.3% 12 
(4) Single Individual 17.0% 5.6% 50 
(5) Entity 9.8% 4.7% 58 
Total 12.7% 6.1% 388 
Institutional Lead Plaintiffs:  Categories 1 & 3 5.8% 4.1% 46 
All Other Lead Plaintiffs Post-PSLRA 13.7% 5.3% 214 
 
Surprisingly, pre-PSLRA cases show the highest median settlement 
percentage of provable loss ratio, although the post-PSLRA single individual 
lead plaintiff category exhibits the highest average percentage recovery.  By 
contrast, institutional lead plaintiffs have the lowest average and median 
recovery percentages of any group.  This would seem to indicate that 
institutional investors are doing a worse job of recovering the losses of class 
members.  The regression analysis in Part II.C.2.d below provides a more 
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positive explanation of the institution’s contribution. 
To briefly summarize the descriptive statistics, the most important finding 
is that institutional investors file the biggest cases, while the pre- and post-
PSLRA data seems very similar for the lead plaintiffs falling within Categories 
2, 4, and 5.  Given the relatively small number of institutional investor cases 
that are filed, it does not appear that the passage of PSLRA has resulted in 
much change in securities fraud class action awards.  In the next section, we 
dig deeper into the data to test these univariate findings. 
2.  Hypothesis Testing. — In this section, we use multivariate regression 
analysis to better understand the interrelationships between the variables.  We 
focus on four questions:  (1) Has PSLRA increased settlement amounts; (2) 
what factors do institutional lead plaintiffs consider most important in deciding 
to become lead plaintiffs; (3) does the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff 
increase settlement sizes; and (4) which type of lead plaintiff among the three 
noninstitutional lead plaintiff categories performs best?  We note that in all of 
the following regressions we use a logarithmic transformation of all the 
variables measured in dollars.  This technique mitigates the effect of some 
large outliers in the data. 
a.  Impact of Lead Plaintiff Provision on Settlement Amounts. — One 
important policy question is whether settlements in the post-PSLRA period are 
larger than those in the pre-PSLRA era.  Supporters of the PSLRA claimed that 
its multiple provisions would reduce the incidence of strike suits and that more 
meritorious suits would be successfully prosecuted in the less lawyer-driven 
environment.  That is, cases filed after the passage of PSLRA can proceed only 
by satisfying a demanding pleading requirement and an opportunity for the suit 
to be superintended by a class member with a substantial financial stake in the 
suit’s outcome.148  Hence, the supporters reasoned that there would be fewer 
cheap settlements of strong claims and fewer frivolous suits filed.149  If true, 
this should increase settlement values post-PSLRA. 
Table 9 presents the results for our regression analysis of the determinants 
of settlements.  The dependent variable is settlement amounts with independent 
variables for estimated provable losses, market capitalization, length of class 
period, and two dummy variables.  “Dummy-SEC” is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of 1 if there is a parallel SEC action and a value of 0 if there is 
not.  It can be thought of as a proxy for quality of a case, as the SEC is more 
likely to file an enforcement action against companies experiencing fraud.  
“Dummy-PSLRA” has a value equal to 1 for post-PSLRA cases and a value of 
0 for pre-PSLRA cases. 
 
 
148. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
149. Of course, there may be other reasons for fewer frivolous cases being filed after the 
Act’s passage, including the possibility of court-ordered sanctions for frivolous cases and the 
increased use of motions to dismiss. 
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Table 9:  Determinants of Log (Settlement Amounts) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Log (Provable Losses) 0.33 0.043 7.66 0.000 
Log (Market Capitalization) 0.13 0.033 3.89 0.000 
Class Period 0.02 0.007 2.45 0.015 
Dummy-SEC 0.40 0.125 3.16 0.002 
Dummy-PSLRA -0.13 0.106 -1.25 0.213 
Intercept 4.11 0.376 10.94 0.000 
R-squared 0.50       
Adjusted R-squared 0.49       
 
Table 9 reports one of the most significant findings of our study.  Once 
we control for estimated losses, market capitalization of the defendant firms, 
the length of the class period, and the presence of a parallel SEC action, post-
PSLRA settlements are not statistically different from those in the pre-PSLRA 
period.  These results suggest that the enactment of PSLRA had no significant 
impact on settlement size.150  This finding raises the question whether PSLRA 
and all of its procedural and substantive bells and whistles have been worth the 
candle. 
b.  Determinants of Institutional Lead Plaintiff’s Decision to Come 
Forward. — We next try to explain the determinants of institutional investors’ 
decisions to become lead plaintiffs.  As we discussed earlier,151 relatively few 
institutional investors have chosen to become lead plaintiffs, and they have 
been very selective in their interventions.  Our conversations with these 
institutions and their attorneys lead us to believe that the decision criteria focus 
primarily on the likelihood that the institution will be able to increase 
substantially its recovery over what it would otherwise expect.  Thus, we 
would anticipate that institutional investors likely “cherry pick” cases, 
selecting those where there are substantial potential damages and a high 
probability of corporate malfeasance.  Table 10 presents our regression results.  
The dependent dummy variable measures the presence of an institutional lead 
plaintiff, taking a value of 1 when an institution is lead plaintiff and 0 
 
150. To test the robustness of this finding, we broke our sample into several subsamples 
with low, middle, and high settlement amounts and ran the regression for each of them separately.  
In each case, the coefficient on the PSLRA dummy remains insignificant. 
151. See supra Part I.C. 
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otherwise.152 
Table 10:  Determinants of Institutional Investors’ Decisions to Be Lead 
Plaintiff (Logit Regression Analysis, post-PSLRA cases)153 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Log (Provable Losses) 0.32 0.155 2.10 0.036 
Log (Total Assets) 0.40 0.141 2.85 0.004 
Class Period 0.03 0.019 1.45 0.148 
Dummy-SEC 1.23 0.404 3.05 0.002 
Intercept -8.44 1.662 -5.08 0.000 
McFadden R-squared 0.26      
The regression shows that provable losses, total assets, and SEC actions 
are statistically significant variables.  In other words, an institutional investor is 
more likely to become a lead plaintiff for cases against large capitalization 
 
152. Logit regression allows us to handle binary dependant variables and to evaluate the 
effect of a change in predictive variables on an event probability.  In our case, such an event is the 
decision of an institutional investor to become a lead plaintiff.  Since logit is a nonlinear 
regression, its coefficients do not have a simple interpretation.  Specifically, consider the 
population logit model with multiple regressors: 
 
Pr(Y=1 | X1, X2 . . . Xn) = F(b0 + b1·X1 + . . . bn·Xn)  
 
The effect of a change in, for example, the first regressor can be understood by calculating the 
difference in predicted probabilities: 
 
Pr(Y=1 | X1*+dX1, X2* . . . Xn*) -  Pr(Y=1 | X1*, X2* . . . Xn*), 
 
which, given the previous equation, equals to: 
 
F(b0 + b1·[X1*+dX1] + . . . bn·Xn*) - F(b0 + b1·X1* + . . . bn·Xn*) 
 
Notice that one must decide on the initial value of the regressor whose effect is of interest, as well 
as all other regressors.  One solution is to fix the regressors at their sample means or other 
appropriate levels (here, fixed values are denoted with a “*”).  The quantitative effect, of course, 
will critically depend on the prespecified levels of regressors.  The qualitative effect, on the other 
hand, is easy to assess since F is the cumulative distribution function.  For example, a positive 
sign on the estimated coefficient of the provable loss variable suggests that, all else equal, cases 
with high aggregate damages are more attractive to institutional investors.  Thus, higher levels of 
provable losses increase the probability that institutions come forward as lead plaintiffs. 
153. We use total assets instead of market capitalization because there is a high degree of 
multicollinearity between the estimated aggregate damages and the size of the defendant 
company (the correlation between provable losses and market capitalization is about 80%).  Total 
assets is another credible measure of the size of the defendant company, and it has the advantage 
of avoiding the multicollinearity problem because it has a smaller correlation (about 65%) with 
provable losses. 
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firms, with bigger estimated losses, and when the SEC has filed a parallel 
action.  The decision to become a lead plaintiff seems not to be affected by the 
amount of estimated provable losses. 
c.  Impact of Institutional Lead Plaintiff on Settlements. — We next 
analyze whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff leads to a greater 
recovery.  A popular thesis is that institutional investors are better monitors 
than individuals, or groups of individuals, because they have larger financial 
interests in the settlement and do not suffer from the collective action problems 
experienced by groups of individuals trying to act as monitors.154 
We have already seen in Table 4 that institutional investor lead plaintiffs 
are associated with larger settlements, but is their presence the reason for the 
larger recovery?  In order to sort out whether it is the institutional lead plaintiff 
or some other factor that results in bigger settlements, we include independent 
variables for the market capitalization of the defendant company, the strength 
of the claim, the size of the estimated damages, and the presence of a parallel 
SEC action.  The variable “Provable Losses * Dummy-Institution” equals the 
amount of estimated provable losses in the settlement if the lead plaintiff is an 
institutional lead plaintiff and 0 otherwise.155  We use this term to test whether 
the elasticity of the amount of settlement with respect to provable losses goes 
up (i.e., the percentage rate at which a typical settlement increases relative to a 
1% increase in provable losses) when there is an institutional lead plaintiff.156  
In other words, a positive value on this coefficient indicates that the relative 
recovery is higher if there is an institutional lead plaintiff.157  Table 11 gives 
the results of our regressions. 
 
Table 11:  Determinants of Log (Settlement Amount), post-PSLRA cases 
 
154. See supra Part I.D.2. 
155. This variable is the cross-product of the amount of provable losses and a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if an institution is among a lead plaintiff group and 0 otherwise.  The 
interpretation of the results is the following:  If we consider two cases that differ in the type of 
lead plaintiff but have the same market capitalization, class period, and the presence of an SEC 
action, then the elasticity of the dollar amount recovered in the class action with respect to the 
amount of provable losses increases by 0.04 in the case of an institutional lead plaintiff.  That is, 
for the case without an institutional lead plaintiff, the elasticity of the settlement is equal to 0.26, 
while for the case with an institutional lead plaintiff it goes up to 0.3 (0.26 + 0.04), with the 
increase being economically and statistically significant.  
 We note that this variable does not exhibit a high degree of multicollinearity with the 
provable loss variable, with the correlation coefficient equal to 0.42. 
156. One possible objection to this equation is that there might be an endogeneity problem 
because of uncertainty whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff caused a higher 
settlement or whether the presence of a higher potential settlement attracted an institutional lead 
plaintiff.  We considered this problem, but determined it was not an issue.  By the time the 
settlement agreement is reached, the identity of the lead plaintiff is already determined, which 
eliminates any potential endogeneity. 
157. We had no prior hypothesis about what the correct specification for this variable should 
be and therefore tried several specifications, including a linear specification.  The reported form 
of equation gave the best fit to the data. 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Log (Provable Losses) 0.26 0.055 4.85 0.000 
Log (Market Capitalization) 0.13 0.039 3.25 0.001 
Class Period 0.02 0.008 1.96 0.052 
Dummy-SEC 0.33 0.161 2.02 0.045 
Log (Provable Losses) * Dummy-Institution 0.04 0.017 2.07 0.040 
Intercept 4.70 0.526 8.95 0.000 
R-squared 0.47       
Adjusted R-squared 0.45       
 
The increased recoveries observed when an institution serves as the lead 
plaintiffs are economically and statistically significant.  For each 1% increase 
in provable losses, the settlement amount increases 0.26%.  If there is an 
institution as lead plaintiff, the settlement amount increases an additional 
0.04%.158  Institutional lead plaintiffs, therefore, increase settlement size, all 
other things being held constant.159  Most of the independent variables in this 
equation are statistically significant at the 5% level, with only class period 
slightly less significant, at the 5.2% level. 
d.  Impact of Other Types of Lead Plaintiffs. — Having found that 
institutional lead plaintiffs positively increase settlements, we next ask the 
same question about a single individual (“individuals”), an aggregation of 
individuals (“aggregations”), and a group that includes a noninstitutional entity 
(“entities”).160  Is any one of these three superior to the other two? 
 
158. In other words, holding all other regressors fixed, a 1% increase in provable losses 
yields a 0.26% increase in the amount of settlement plus an additional 0.04% increase if the lead 
plaintiff is an institution.  The dollar amount of this effect obviously depends on starting (or 
benchmark) levels of variables.  For example, let us, for expositional simplicity, assume that the 
sample median of settlement amount ($5.7 million) corresponds to the median amount of 
provable losses ($91 million).  Then, if the amount of estimated aggregate losses increases by 
$9.1 million, the amount of settlement is expected to increase by $148,000 and $171,000 in the 
case of noninstitutional and institutional lead plaintiffs, respectively. 
 We note that these results appear inconsistent with the findings of Professor Alexander that 
settlement size is invariant to the merits of a case in securities class action litigation.  See Janet 
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 
Stan. L. Rev. 497, 499–500 (1991). 
159. Of course, we cannot control for all other factors, only the ones on which we have data.  
There may be other indicators of quality that we are not capturing.  If so, it could still be true that 
higher recoveries remain a function of these other better qualities of the cases selected by 
institutions. 
160. For a subsample of 162 cases for which we had data, we calculated the percentage of 
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We saw earlier that the three groups, post-PSLRA, are not statistically 
different across mean and median length of the class period, market 
capitalization of defendant companies, time to reach settlement, and the ratio 
of settlement amount to provable losses.  However, the median settlement 
amounts are statistically different at the 1% level.  The median settlement 
amount for the entities, at $6.5 million, is nearly double that for individuals 
($3.3 million) and one-third larger than that for aggregations ($4.4 million).  
The relative settlement amounts across these three types of lead plaintiffs 
mirror in some respect their differences in provable losses:  The median 
provable loss for entities ($148.5 million) is nearly double the median provable 
loss for settlements with individuals ($76 million) and 38% greater than when 
the lead plaintiff is an aggregation ($91.8 million).161  Thus, as among the 
three types of noninstitutional lead plaintiffs, it appears that entities bring cases 
against larger companies that have larger market capitalization, significantly 
greater provable losses, and larger settlement amounts. 
To examine more fully our data regarding the three types of 
noninstitutional lead plaintiffs, we divide the post-PSLRA settlements for each 
type of lead plaintiff into three groups based on the market capitalization of the 
defendant (i.e., highest third, middle third, and lowest third of market 
capitalization).  After doing so, we observe that for the individuals, the size in 
dollars of the settlements reached against the lowest-tier market capitalization 
defendants are bigger than those reached against the top-tier market 
capitalization defendants.  The other two types of lead plaintiffs exhibit the 
opposite pattern, with settlement amounts increasing with the defendant firms’ 
market capitalization.162  On the other hand, the provable loss ratio declines 
significantly across all three types of lead plaintiffs as market capitalization 
and provable losses increase.  However, individuals perform better than the 
other two types of lead plaintiffs in the bottom-tier cases.  The converse is true 
in the top-tier cases.  In short, it appears that individuals perform best in the 
small cases and perform worst in the big cases. 
To further examine the relative strengths of these three types of lead 
plaintiffs, we performed a regression analysis similar to the one in Table 9.  
Specifically, we regressed the logarithm of the settlement amount on the 
logarithms of provable losses and market capitalization as well as on the length 
 
settlements reached by the largest plaintiffs’ law firm by type of lead plaintiff.  We found that the 
largest firm filed 87% of the cases brought by individual lead plaintiffs, 32% of the institutional 
lead plaintiff cases, and roughly 65% of the remaining cases.  These differences were not 
statistically significant, although we did find that the presence of this particular law firm did 
result in faster settlements without a significant loss in settlement value. 
161. Although these medians’ differences are statistically significant at the 20% level, this is 
outside generally accepted standards of significance.   
162. We performed the same analysis with provable losses.  We found modest increases in 
settlement amount for individuals between the bottom and top market capitalization tiers based on 
relative provable losses, but dramatically larger increases for the other two types of plaintiffs:  
Increases were nearly triple for entities and quadruple for aggregations. 
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of class period and a dummy variable that controls for a parallel SEC action.  
In addition, we included two cross-product terms that would allow us to test 
how individuals’ performance in terms of relative recovery differs from the 
performance of other lead plaintiff types.  The results are shown in Table 
12.163  The residual category in this specification includes the pre-PSLRA 
cases, and therefore all coefficients measure the effect of the variable in 
comparison to the pre-PSLRA levels. 
 
Table 12:  Effect of Individual Lead Plaintiff on Log (Settlement Amount)164 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Log (Provable Losses) 0.25 0.059 4.14 0.000 
Log (Provable Losses) * Single Lead Plaintiff -0.09 0.118 -0.78 0.438 
Log (Market Capitalization) 0.21 0.039 5.40 0.000 
Log (Market Capitalization) * Single Lead Plaintiff -0.08 0.033 -2.34 0.020 
Class Period 0.02 0.007 2.82 0.006 
Dummy-SEC 0.18 0.167 1.10 0.274 
Intercept 7.44 0.211 35.29 0.000 
R-squared 0.33    
Adjusted R-squared 0.31    
 
 
These results are consistent with the discussion above.  In particular, the 
variable “Log (Market Capitalization) * Single Lead Plaintiff” is negative and 
significant, showing that the elasticity of the amount of settlement with respect 
to market capitalization deteriorates significantly if a single individual acts as a 
 
163. This regression is calculated for the subsample of cases involving individuals, groups 
of individuals, and other entities only.  We do not include cases involving institutional investors. 
164. As mentioned earlier, see supra note 153, the amount of provable losses is highly 
correlated with the size of the defendant company.  Given that market capitalization and provable 
losses are highly correlated, including both in the regression will lead to estimates that may not 
correctly reflect an individual effect of each variable.  To circumvent this problem, we first 
regress provable losses onto market capitalization; the residual from this regression, 
consequently, is orthogonal to the size of the defendant company.  We then use this residual in the 
regression specification presented in Table 12—this technique allows us to track the effect of 
provable losses on the amount of settlement beyond that contained in the market capitalization 
variable and to separate and analyze the effect of provable losses.  While this procedure affects 
point estimates of regression coefficients, it does not affect the overall fit of the regression. 
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lead plaintiff as opposed to a group of individuals or an entity.165  Thus for 
each 1% increase in market capitalization, the settlement amount increases by 
0.21%.  If the lead plaintiff is an individual, the increase is only 0.13%.  The 
same result appears in the relative recovery per additional percent of provable 
losses.  This decline, however, is not statistically significant.  In short, 
individual lead plaintiffs do best in increasing settlements in small cases, while 
the two groups do better for the larger ones.166 
e.  Explaining the Decline in Provable Loss Ratios. — As we noted in our 
discussion of Table 8, our univariate analysis shows that provable loss ratios 
(that is, the ratio of settlement amounts to estimated provable losses) 
apparently declined in the post-PSLRA period.  To unpack this result, we use a 
multivariate regression of the determinants of these ratios and present the 
results in Table 13. 
 
Table 13:  Determinants of Provable Loss Ratio 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Log (Market Capitalization) -1.20 0.315 -3.80 0.000 
Class Period -0.20 0.087 -2.30 0.022 
Dummy-SEC167 -0.11 1.640 -0.07 0.945 
Dummy-Institution -5.69 1.994 -2.85 0.005 
Dummy-Group of Individuals -2.76 2.087 -1.32 0.187 
Dummy-Institution and Individuals -5.67 2.497 -2.27 0.024 
Dummy-Single Individual -6.11 2.256 -2.71 0.007 
Dummy-Entity -2.23 2.734 -0.81 0.416 
Intercept 21.87 2.607 8.39 0.000 
          
 
165. The intuition behind this result is identical to that explained at supra note 155. 
166. The regression reported in Table 12 is specified in logs.  As such, it allows us to 
analyze the impact of the lead plaintiff type on the relative recovery in settlements, not the 
absolute dollar amount. 
167. This variable refers to the presence of an SEC enforcement action involving the same 
misrepresentation that is the subject of the class action settlement.  In a separate study, we 
examined the effects on settlements when there is a parallel SEC enforcement action vis-à-vis 
when there is not.  See Cox & Thomas, SEC Heuristics, supra note 8, at 767–74 (concluding that 
private suits with parallel SEC enforcement actions settle sooner and finding some evidence that 
such suits also recover higher percentages of provable losses, particularly in very low percentage 
recovery cases). 
LEADPLAINTIFFCOLUMBIAFINAL 11/8/2006  4:13:16 PM 
150 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 100:2 
R-squared 8.1%     
Adjusted R-squared 5.5%       
 
Table 13 shows that provable loss ratios have significantly declined in the 
post-PSLRA period from their pre-PSLRA level for both categories of 
institutional investors and the individuals.168  These results are robust to 
different specifications of the regression equation, although the explanatory 
power of the equation is quite low.169 
Institutional investors bring cases in which the estimated provable losses 
are very high, and the amount of settlement dollars, although greater on 
average than in the pre-PSLRA period,170 nonetheless did not increase as 
rapidly as did provable losses.171  One possible reason for the relatively slower 
rate of growth of settlement amounts relative to provable losses might be that 
the amount of the defendants’ insurance policies have not kept pace with the 
firm’s exposure as captured by the provable losses in individual cases.172  One 
practitioner commenting on these results suggested that $100 million is the top 
end of the insurance coverage for these cases.173  If PSLRA has increased 
 
168. We were also concerned that the relatively short period of time between the end of our 
sample and our analysis might bias our results in favor of finding that post-PSLRA cases had 
lower provable loss ratios.  In results not shown, we tested to see if the length of time to 
settlement had an effect on the results shown in Table 11, panel B.  We found this term to be 
insignificant when included in the regression analysis.  We also found that the length of the 
settlement period is only weakly correlated with the settlement amount and estimated provable 
losses.  We conclude that the shorter time to settlement is not a significant determinant of the 
differences between our pre-PSLRA and post-PSLRA provable loss ratios. 
169. In addition to the results shown, we used specifications that included replacing market 
capitalization with other proxies for firm size such as the amount of total assets, combining 
dummy variables into coarser groups, and excluding variables that did not seem to affect 
significantly the dependent variable. 
170. See supra Table 4. 
171. Our results are consistent with those found by Buckberg et al. in their recent survey of 
trends in the shareholder class action area.  See Buckberg et al., WorldCom and Enron, supra note 
23, at 6 (showing decline in median ratio of settlement to investor losses from 6.1% in 1995 to 
2.5% in 2005). 
172. We strongly suspect that an important variable in the settlement process is the amount 
of insurance available.  We did not examine this variable for several reasons.  First, it would be 
quite burdensome (and in many cases fruitless) to try to obtain this information.  The amount of 
insurance coverage is not disclosed in SEC filings; hence, this information would have to be 
obtained from the documents obtained by plaintiff’s counsel through discovery.  Second, and 
more importantly, the standard insurance policy is akin to a wasting asset in the sense that 
litigation expenses (most importantly attorneys’ fees for the company as well as covered officers 
and directors) are paid periodically throughout the life of the suit.  Thus, what is relevant is not 
the initial amount of available insurance but the coverage that has not been depleted when the 
hour of settlement approaches.  Discovering this figure in each of our cases would be truly a 
Herculean if not imponderable undertaking. 
173. These comments were made by Geoffrey C. Jarvis, a director of Grant & Eisenhofer, 
P.A., during a conference held at Fordham Law School.  Both authors attended this conference, 
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defense costs on average by prolonging these cases, then that may also drain 
the funds in the typical insurance policy.174 
In cases involving individual lead plaintiffs, the interpretation is more 
difficult.  We know that on average these cases are the smallest ones in the 
post-PSLRA period in terms of settlement amounts, market capitalization of 
the defendant firms, and estimated provable losses.  We speculate that since 
these cases typically involve issuers with relatively small market 
capitalizations, they attract fewer large institutional investors, who generally 
eschew small issuers because of liquidity concerns.  Thus, smaller investors are 
more likely to become lead plaintiffs. 
If these investors are the worst monitors of plaintiffs’ counsel, and 
therefore the least likely to reduce litigation agency costs, settlements in these 
cases may recover lower levels of provable losses compared to the pre-PSLRA 
cases when we adjust for the effect of market capitalization and the length of 
the class period.  This could explain the apparent disparity between the 
univariate results shown in Table 8 and the multiple regression results 
appearing in Table 13. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
We find that institutional lead plaintiffs add value for shareholders, 
although perhaps not as much as was expected by the architects of PSLRA’s 
lead plaintiff provision.  Our data shows that institutions increase settlements 
by 0.04% for every 1% increase in provable losses.  Although this is small, it is 
statistically significant among the variables we examined.  Institutional lead 
plaintiffs appear in cases involving larger provable losses and generate better 
recoveries in those cases, but they appear in very few cases, at least during the 
period of our data set.  Moreover, given the difficulty of controlling for all 
aspects of quality, it is also possible that the higher settlements in these cases 
may reflect that institutions take the better cases. 
Our real concern about institutions is that they do not seem to be able to 
increase dollar recoveries at the same pace as provable losses.  This is 
disappointing and facially inconsistent with institutional lead plaintiffs’ beliefs 
that they can double or triple recoveries overall.175  We also need to assess 
 
which was held on November 4, 2005. 
174. PSLRA has led to longer times before cases reach settlement than under the old 
system.  See Elaine Buckberg et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Securities Class 
Action Litigation:  Will Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides? 5 (2003) (“Prior to 
PSLRA, 61% of cases were disposed in three years and 77% in five years; since, only 44% have 
been disposed in three years and 62% in five years.”).  If this increases litigation costs for the 
parties, then less money is left in the policy for paying class members because most directors’ and 
officers’ insurance policies deduct defense costs out of the amount of the policy’s coverage.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel will also incur greater costs from any increased litigation, and these may 
increase the amount of any attorneys’ fees award that they obtain in a settlement. 
175. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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how institutional shareholders will impact settlements if they appear in a 
broader set of cases.  Our data reflects that institutions do increase settlements 
relative to other types of lead plaintiffs, although the increase, while 
statistically significant, is small.  We therefore question whether institutions’ 
sole goal is to maximize settlement amounts.  Instead, we believe they might 
see their role as balancing settlements against the long-term interests of the 
defendant company whose shares the institution may continue to own.  In that 
scenario, institutions can be expected to trade off higher recoveries against the 
company’s treasury for small recoveries against the insurer and officers 
responsible for the fund as well as prospective reforms of the company’s 
corporate governance structure. 
More generally, we were surprised to find that provable loss ratios have 
declined in the post-PSLRA period.  While we must be cautious not to 
overinterpret this result, its potential significance is enormous:  Investors 
appear to be recovering a smaller percentage of their losses today than they did 
before the passage of the Act.176  We speculate about some explanations for 
this phenomenon, such as a relatively slow rate of growth of insurance 
policies, but this remains an important area for more research. 
On a policy level, we continue to support the overall value of financial 
institutions serving as lead plaintiffs.  Our major recommendations focus on 
nurturing greater participation in securities class actions by institutional lead 
plaintiffs.  Steps in this direction would not only be consistent with our data 
but also with the legislative history of the PSLRA, which is richly laden with 
expectations that class action suits would be greatly improved by attracting 
institutions to become the suits’ plaintiffs.177 
In particular, we believe courts should be more willing, indeed activist, in 
awarding costs to institutional lead plaintiffs for all expenses related to an 
institution’s participation as a lead plaintiff.  Such awards should compensate 
the institution not only for direct costs of participation, such as travel or 
deposition time related to the suit’s prosecution, but should also include 
reasonable reimbursement for indirect costs such as those recounted earlier.178  
Indeed, we believe any award of costs should be some multiple of the actual 
amount attributed to the damages.179 
The appropriate analogy is to the “lodestar” method for determining fee 
awards in class action suits.180  Just as the class counsel is rewarded for such 
 
176. As noted earlier, this result is confirmed in Buckberg et al., WorldCom and Enron, 
supra note 23, at 6 (showing decline in median ratio of settlement to investor losses from 6.1% in 
1995 to 2.5% in 2005). 
177. See supra note 27–31 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra Part I.C.3. 
179. The professional plaintiffs limitation in PSLRA, discussed further at infra note 181, 
could be used to police any aberrant behavior, such as taking lots of cases to make money on the 
reimbursement multiple. 
180. The lodestar method of calculating attorney fee awards in class actions takes the 
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factors as the uncertainty of the suit, the skill and experience devoted to the 
suit’s prosecution, and the ultimate outcome, we believe similar considerations 
should justify awarding to the institutional lead plaintiff an award greater than 
the costs directly attributable to the suit.  We hope this would encourage more 
institutions to adopt socially desirable internal and external procedures to 
evaluate their decision to become a lead plaintiff. 
Furthermore, we believe courts generally should follow the lead of the 
few judges that have been willing, in the right circumstances, to excuse the 
“professional plaintiff” restrictions of the PSLRA.181  Simply stated, a 
demonstrated record as a diligent monitor of the present suit, when coupled 
with a good track record of being such a monitor in other cases, should be 
more than enough to persuade the court that the petitioning institution has only 
the positive characteristics associated with being a professional plaintiff.  We 
 
number of hours worked by class counsel and multiplies them by a reasonable hourly rate with 
some adjustments for factors like the uncertainty of the suit and the skill and experience of 
counsel.  This method has been criticized by some scholars as creating financial incentives for 
class counsel to prolong the litigation and for giving these attorneys little incentive to try to 
maximize the class recovery.  See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements:  An Opt-In 
Proposal, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 903, 911 n.54 (arguing that lodestar method “results in collusion 
[with defendants] even more than does the contingent fee”); Charles Silver, Due Process and the 
Lodestar Method:  You Can’t Get There from Here, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1809, 1817–20 (2000) 
(noting several ways in which contingency fee arrangements are superior). 
181. The PSLRA added § 21D(a)(3)(B)(vi) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,  see 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101(b), § 
21D(a)(3)(B)(vi), 109 Stat. 737, 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2000)), which 
bars one from serving as a lead plaintiff if during the preceding three-year period the person has 
been a lead plaintiff in more than five securities class actions, unless the court otherwise approves 
that such a plaintiff being a representative is “consistent with the purposes of” the lead plaintiff 
provision.  Id.  Most courts recognize that the professional plaintiff bar is less applicable or even 
inapplicable to institutional investors.  See Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 
627, 640–41 (D.N.J. 2002) (collecting cases).  Our approach is less sweeping and generally 
follows the results reached in a series of cases initiated by the Florida State Board of 
Administration (FSBA), which is a frequent lead plaintiff in securities suits.  Courts have invoked 
the bar against FSBA when another party whose losses are greater is petitioning to become the 
lead plaintiff, see In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 818–24 (N.D. Ohio 1999) 
(choosing as plaintiff group two plaintiffs whose losses were twice those of FSBA during relevant 
class period), or when an institution whose losses are less than that of FSBA is petitioning to be 
the lead plaintiff.  See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 456–57 (S.D. Tex. 2002) 
(justifying in part selection of another institution whose losses were 40% those of FSBA because 
FSBA was actively involved in four ongoing suits); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 1146, 1156–57 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (justifying in part disqualification of FSBA because of 
presence of other institutional investors seeking to serve as lead plaintiff).  FSBA has been 
excused from the professional plaintiff bar when it is the only institution petitioning to be a lead 
plaintiff.  See In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 299 (D. Del. 2003) 
(explaining selection of FSBA as lead plaintiff based on its attention to suit despite its status as 
lead plaintiff in eight other suits); Naiditch v. Applied Micro Circuits Corp., No. 01-CV-0649, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21374, at *2–*3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (selecting FSBA with losses of 
$5.3 million over two individuals with losses of $980,000); In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig, 156 
F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (preferring FSBA to other flawed institutional investors 
despite FSBA’s status as lead plaintiff in six ongoing suits). 
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believe this exception is more easily made when the institution has internal 
safeguards, such as those required by a few states, which insulate the decision 
to become a lead plaintiff from “pay-to-play” influences.182  More generally, 
all institutions considering becoming a lead plaintiff should adopt procedures 
to insulate their internal processes from the harmful effects of political 
contributions by class action law firms. 
If we consider the remaining types of lead plaintiffs, our data supports the 
view that groups perform better than individuals as lead plaintiffs in larger 
cases, while groups that include an entity yield larger settlements and greater 
provable loss ratios than those that occur with mere aggregation of individuals.  
These are among the most surprising findings of our study because most 
commentators (ourselves included) have cast a skeptical eye toward 
aggregation as a means of finding the most adequate plaintiff.  However, our 
earlier supposition that a group would perform worse than an individual is not 
borne out by our settlement size and provable loss data. 
We suspect that any group’s strength as a monitor is correlated positively 
to the biggest group member’s financial stake in the suit.  We have not tested 
this hypothesis because we lack data on which to conduct such a test, but our 
small sample of cases in Table 2, showing stock ownership of lead plaintiffs, is 
suggestive in this regard.  Nevertheless, we believe that, when a court is 
considering two competing groups of individuals, the relative inquiry should 
not be which group has the largest financial loss but rather the relative size of 
the financial loss suffered by the biggest owner in each group.  In other words, 
courts should look most critically at the size of the largest group member’s 
stake in deciding between otherwise similar groups. 
Single individual plaintiffs perform best in the smallest cases.  This is 
encouraging because no institutions apply to be appointed lead plaintiff in 
these cases.  Smaller capitalization firms with their concomitant smaller 
provable losses mean that the costs of being a lead plaintiff in such a suit dwarf 
the likely benefits from doing so.  Moreover, most financial institutions do not 
hold shares in very small market capitalization defendants because of their 
illiquid nature.  Hence, suits against such defendant companies are likely to 
remain the domain of individual investors or groups of individual investors. 
Conversely, in bigger cases with larger provable losses, single individual 
lead plaintiffs do worse than institutional plaintiffs.  We suspect this is due to 
inattention by the lead plaintiff and the eagerness of the suit’s class counsel to 
reap the proffered settlement rather than to push for a larger settlement.  It is in 
this domain that the securities class action remains lawyer driven and that the 
ill effects that the lead plaintiff provision was designed to address continue to 
abound.  Groups seem to be preferable in these situations. 
Finally, we wish to reiterate our concerns about the possible “pay-to-play” 
 
182. See supra Part I.D.1. 
LEADPLAINTIFFCOLUMBIAFINAL 11/8/2006  4:13:16 PM 
2006] DOES THE PLAINTIFF MATTER? 155 
practices that are alleged to be emerging in this area.183  We think that this 
type of allegation, if widely substantiated, could undermine the legitimacy and 
utility of the lead plaintiff provision.  The simplest, and perhaps most effective, 
solution would be for courts to require plaintiffs’ law firms that are candidates 
for the lead counsel position to disclose any campaign contributions or other 
payments they have made to prospective class representatives, their managers, 
directors, or other control persons, before the court appoints a lead plaintiff for 
the class.  Hopefully, this disclosure would put to rest ugly rumors and also 
serve as a good disinfectant. 
 
 
183. See supra Part I.D.1. 
